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A translation of Hegel's German text. It includes a bilingual annotated glossary, bibliographic and interpretive notes to Hegel's text, an Index of References for works cited in the notes, a select Bibliography of various works on Hegel's logic, and an Index." A translation of Hegel's German text. It includes a bilingual annotated glossary, bibliographic and interpretive notes to Hegel's text, an Index of References for works cited in the notes, a select Bibliography of various works on Hegel's logic, and an Index."


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A translation of Hegel's German text. It includes a bilingual annotated glossary, bibliographic and interpretive notes to Hegel's text, an Index of References for works cited in the notes, a select Bibliography of various works on Hegel's logic, and an Index." A translation of Hegel's German text. It includes a bilingual annotated glossary, bibliographic and interpretive notes to Hegel's text, an Index of References for works cited in the notes, a select Bibliography of various works on Hegel's logic, and an Index."

30 review for The Encyclopaedia Logic: The Encyclopaedia of Philosophical Sciences 1 with the Zusätze

  1. 5 out of 5

    Ahmad Sharabiani

    Wissenschaft der Logik = Hegel's Science of Logic, c1998, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 - 1831), Arnold V. Miller, John Niemeyer Findlay Science of Logic, first published between 1812 and 1816, is the work in which Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel outlined his vision of logic. Hegel's logic is a system of dialectics, i.e., a dialectical metaphysics: It is a development of the principle that thought and being constitute a single and active unity. Science of Logic also incorporates the tradition Wissenschaft der Logik = Hegel's Science of Logic, c1998, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770 - 1831), Arnold V. Miller, John Niemeyer Findlay Science of Logic, first published between 1812 and 1816, is the work in which Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel outlined his vision of logic. Hegel's logic is a system of dialectics, i.e., a dialectical metaphysics: It is a development of the principle that thought and being constitute a single and active unity. Science of Logic also incorporates the traditional Aristotelian syllogism: It is conceived as a phase of the "original unity of thought and being" rather than as a detached, formal instrument of inference. تاریخ نخستین خوانش» روز بیست و چهارم ماه می سال 2014 میلادی عنوان: علم منطق؛ نوشته: گئورک ویلهلم فریدریش هگل؛ ترجمه به انگلیسی: آرنولد و. میلر؛ مقدمه: جان نیمایر فایندلی؛ مترجم: رحیم صبح زاهدی؛ مشخصات نشر: رفسنجان، سورمه، 1392، در 260 ص، موضوع: منطق، از نویسندگان آلمانی - سده 19 م عنوان: علم منطق؛ نوشته: گئورک ویلهلم فریدریش هگل؛ مترجم: حسن مرتضوی؛ تهران، لاهیتا‏‫؛ 1392؛ در 467 ص؛ شابک: 978600927198؛ موضوع: منطق، از نویسندگان آلمانی - سده 19 م کتابی‌ست از هگل، که دیدگاه ایشان را درباره ی منطق را شرح می‌دهد، و در واقع نوعی هستی‌ شناسی ست که قیاس منطقی ارسطویی را به عنوان یک زیر مؤلفه و نه بنیاد منطق در نظر می‌گیرد. ا. شربیانی

  2. 4 out of 5

    Trevor

    I haven’t read this book in the way it needs to be read. Really, you would need to sit down with a pen and paper and map out how he makes his way through his logic. I think it would also help to have a kind of guide book alongside me while I was reading this to explain what is going on and to make his allusions to other philosophers and philosophies clearer (and not as ‘taken for granted’). I read this for the first time in my mid-twenties. God knows what I got out of it then. I’m not sure I’ve I haven’t read this book in the way it needs to be read. Really, you would need to sit down with a pen and paper and map out how he makes his way through his logic. I think it would also help to have a kind of guide book alongside me while I was reading this to explain what is going on and to make his allusions to other philosophers and philosophies clearer (and not as ‘taken for granted’). I read this for the first time in my mid-twenties. God knows what I got out of it then. I’m not sure I’ve gotten too much more out of it now, either, I’m afraid. One of the things that people know about Hegel is that he develops all of his ideas according to the ‘triad’ – you posit a thesis, it is somehow related to an antithesis, and in their mutual interaction you end up with a synthesis, which then becomes your new thesis and the process continues. Given this is generally understood as the Hegelian method and since this book is him explaining how logic works, you might expect a long and involved (Hegel likes to be both long and involved – that is certainly true) discussion of this triadic process. However, this thesis and antithesis idea is mentioned only once in the book, and in that case he is discussing it in relation to Kantian philosophy. And here he is anything but complimentary, “However, the proofs that Kant proposes for his theses and antitheses must indeed be regarded as mere pseudo-proofs, since what is supposed to be proved is always already contained in the presuppositions that form the starting-point and only through the long-winded, apagogic process is the semblance of mediation produced.” p. 95 I’ve read other people say exactly the same thing about Hegel’s triad. Still, it is clear that Hegel builds his system using something like this three-part process – although, it is also clear that this is not all he is doing. Key to what is going on here is the idea that our understanding of the world (and philosophy is nothing if not people thinking deeply about what it means to understand the world) has grown and become richer over time. As such, Hegel spends about a third of the Logic on the ‘preliminary conception’ – I guess, a kind of introduction. And here he spends a lot of time discussing the nature of God and the implications of this nature of God to the possibilities for humans to understand that nature. As someone raised an atheist, I found this part of the book hard work, even more hard work than some of the later parts of the book, as I have nothing to hook many of these ideas onto. Still, there was enough ‘philosophy’ mixed in here with the ‘theology’ for me to only feel somewhat lost. His logic proper is in three subdivisions: the doctrine of being, the doctrine of essence and the doctrine of concept. You might think that with each of these subdivisions we are moving further and further away from the ‘real’ world and more into the realm of the abstract. But Hegel’s point is the exact opposite. While we think of ‘being’ as concrete existence, where our being is immediate and rich, our ‘concepts’ are thought of as being abstract and distant from our lived experience. Hegel says that it is the concepts that are rich in their power to help us understand how the world really is and therefore it is these seemingly abstract concepts that prove to be ‘more concrete’ than the ‘merely real’ world of being. Having tools and lenses to view the world with helps us understand the richness of the world and as such it also allows us to see how the world sits in the richness of its interconnectedness. Those interconnections are, for Hegel, the truly concrete necessity of the world. I want to play with these ideas for a minute, not least because they are pretty close to the opposite of how we generally think. His doctrine of being comes in three parts – virtually all divisions and subdivisions in this book are in triplets, as I hinted before – being is divided into quality, quantity and measure. For Hegel, we move from one to the other, but only can understand any of these three by seeing how they interpenetrate each other. Plato is said to be the first really dialectical thinker – Plato, that is, and not Socrates. Hegel points out that for Socrates dialectics was mostly subjective and negative – that is, what he calls irony (p.130). This is important. Socrates was told he was the wisest person alive, but he believed this was a kind of joke, since all he knew was that he knew nothing at all. For Socrates to really be the wisest person alive he needed to show that his ‘wisdom’ lay in the fact that at least he KNEW he didn’t know anything – whereas everyone else thought they were experts, but really didn’t know anything (as the Irish say, their arse from their elbow). It is that which makes Socrates’s dialectic negative. He spent his life asking people to say what they believed to be true, then he would ask them a series of questions and show that they actually believed the opposite of what they started off saying they believed. The dialectic proper is this idea of getting to the truth through understanding that every idea contains in itself its own opposite. But since Socrates was only doing dialectics for the purely negative purpose of showing that he (and everyone else) knew nothing – it was left to Plato to show that the dialectic had a positive side. The example Hegel gives is from the Parmenides where Plato shows that to understand the One you need to understand the Many and vice versa. This isn’t just showing that people are confused, or that knowledge itself is impossible, but rather that in understanding complex ideas you need to understand them in their richness – and that means, in their contradictoriness. That if these ideas are living then they grow and become what they are not from what they are – and therefore had to also have in themselves that opposition. The seed (as he more or less says at one point) isn’t a plant, but to become a plant it needs to have the concept of the plant – its opposite – contained within itself. And this is why Hegel’s system progresses in these three stepped processes – where his discussion of quality necessarily then moves to a discussion of quantity and then onto measure as the unity of quality and quantity. Let’s do that more slowly. Let’s imagine that the world wasn’t created by the Christian God, but by the Greek ones. For the Greeks, the universe prior to creation wasn’t a void like in the Christian universe, but rather it was a chaos. What the gods did was to give form to that chaos. So, how do you do that? Well, a chaos is without form because it has no things in it that you can pick out. To be able to pick things out from the chaos you need to know what qualities those things have. Once you have defined quality you are then able to consider quantity – initially this is as a kind of mathematical counting of how many of one thing there is when compared with something else. But quantity and quality interpenetrate each other too. The example he gives is on p.170 where he talks about the phases of water and therefore the differences that are wrought when you change the quantity of heat in the water and force phase changes – for a long time changing the amount of heat hardly does anything at all, but eventually the liquid either turns to solid or to gas. This idea of quantitative changes making qualitative ones is a key idea here – he also talks of the idea of a man losing a single hair not thinking of himself as necessarily going bald, but he must get to a point where to lose enough hairs baldness is the necessary result. For Plato dialectics was used to show that the world we live in is a world of appearances. That is, Plato noticed the contradictions in the world, and he knew that those contradictions were ‘in the world’ and not just in our understanding – that is, it wasn’t just that our reason wasn’t up to the task of understanding the world, but rather that the world itself actually contained contradictions – as I said before, that the one is the many, for instance. But if that was true, and if the world ought to be ‘perfect’ (and perfect can’t be self-contradictory) then Plato was forced to conclude that the world we live in can’t be the ‘real’ world, but rather one of appearances. Hegel goes a step further than this – the contradictions that exist in the world aren’t just due to our limited understanding, nor to the world being ‘merely of appearances’, but that these contradictions of things (and in things) are how we need to go about understanding the world – to understand the world is to understand those contradictions. That is, the contradictions aren’t mistakes or accidents, but real and provide the actual path to truth. So, one of the parts of this that particularly stood out for me was his discussion of the relationship between freedom and necessity. We generally think of these as being opposites – if I NEED to do something, I can’t really say I’m all that free, and if I freely choose to do something, then surely that can’t have been the same as being under the compulsion of necessity. Ok, even with that said, there are probably times when the two can be brought close together – I need to eat something, or I will die, but what I eat is up to my free will to decide. For Hegel, this example isn’t going far enough. Freedom and necessity are not only opposites, but they interpenetrate each other and so understanding one involves getting a truer understanding of the other. By seeking to understand our own essence those things that seemed open to our free choice and will become increasingly necessary and the things that might have been enforced upon us, if they are true, increasingly become those things that we will freely choose. I had thought that with this three part system that when he got to discussing the syllogism that he would be all praise – but he certainly wasn’t – and that this would be the clear culmination of his philosophy, which I guess it was in a way, even while he also calls it something that is pedantically followed and therefore has mostly fallen out of use. The section on the syllogism (you know, all men are mortal, Socrates is a man, therefore Socrates is mortal) is probably the hardest part of this book – well, for me anyway – and I’m still not sure I understood it at all. This book was hard work, and I’ve started his Science of Logic now too (which, from the looks of things, is pretty much exactly the same book all over again, but hopefully will be written differently enough so as to explain bits I’ve not really understood in ways that will make them a bit clearer). I wanted to talk about difference too – how the world is a kind of kingdom of differences (and how this idea seems to have been used by linguisitics and semiotics in interesting ways), but perhaps that will give me something to talk about when I finish his Science of Logic.

  3. 4 out of 5

    Justin Evans

    This is comparatively clear, and I mean 'compared to the Science of Logic,' which is the most opaque, worst written book of all time. And the actual 'logic' parts of it are really still pretty opaque. But the prefaces and introduction and 'position of thought' stuff are fantastic background for understanding what Hegel was trying to do in general, and it should be mandatory to read it before starting on the Phenomenology or philosophy of history and so on. Unfortunately, vita brevis, and most pe This is comparatively clear, and I mean 'compared to the Science of Logic,' which is the most opaque, worst written book of all time. And the actual 'logic' parts of it are really still pretty opaque. But the prefaces and introduction and 'position of thought' stuff are fantastic background for understanding what Hegel was trying to do in general, and it should be mandatory to read it before starting on the Phenomenology or philosophy of history and so on. Unfortunately, vita brevis, and most people have probably got better things to do. If you are interested in Hegel, though, get this edition of this book, and plunge in.

  4. 5 out of 5

    Anthony Buckley

    I wrote a very quick review when I first dipped into this book. I have decided to write at greater length, mainly for my own benefit. Russell says that Hegel is the most difficult to understand of all the great philosophers. He also says that the place to start is with his Logic. I should add that I have no knowledge of philosophy, and that I found this book very tough. My belief, for what it is worth, is that Hegel is trying to construct a philosophy which embraces the Ancients – Aristotle, and I wrote a very quick review when I first dipped into this book. I have decided to write at greater length, mainly for my own benefit. Russell says that Hegel is the most difficult to understand of all the great philosophers. He also says that the place to start is with his Logic. I should add that I have no knowledge of philosophy, and that I found this book very tough. My belief, for what it is worth, is that Hegel is trying to construct a philosophy which embraces the Ancients – Aristotle, and no doubt the Scholastics – and also the Moderns, the Empiricists and Kantians. He also wants to embrace theology and the natural and human sciences. His goal is to produce a description of the Absolute – the world, the universe and everything – which he equates with God, and which includes both Nature and our understanding of Nature. In short, he has bitten off quite a lot, and the result is difficult to chew. A central idea is that all phenomena have both an outside and an inside. For example, the stars and planets have features visible to the senses which are outward and particular. However, in addition, they have “inner” universal features, invisible to the senses, which can be discovered only by “reflecting” on them. Importantly, everything we know both of outward and inward nature, is, in its own self, the same as it is in thought. Thought consequently expresses the truth about the objects of perception. Hegel therefore speaks of thought or “objective thought” as the kernel of the world. Nature itself is a system of unconscious thought, but in order to avoid seeming to claim that nature is itself conscious, he uses the terms “type” or ”category” for the ambiguous term thought as it is found in nature. From this perspective, Hegel describes and criticises three attitudes of thought towards the objective world One is that of ancient philosophy which, he says, seeks truth in thought itself. The second attitude is empiricism which adopts quite a different attitude from the ancients, seeking the truth in sensuous experience. To this, Hegel also adds the “critical philosophy” of Kant. Both empiricism and critical philosophy, however, fail. The one finds truth merely in the external world, the other finds it in subjectivity. Hegel, however, wants to find the truth both in the external world and in thought (which is directed towards the external world). The third attitude which he criticises is “immediate or intuitive knowledge” (e.g. Schleiermacher?). This seeks to gain the truth about God from mere intuition or contemplation. Hegel condemns this third approach for neglecting both empiricism and criticism. Hegel then presents his own philosophy, in three successive “doctrines”. These are the Doctrine of Being, the Doctrine of Essence, and the Doctrine of the Notion. These roughly correspond to the three “attitudes towards the objective world” discussed earlier, except that each of these is shown in turn to be a moment in Hegel’s whole philosophy. “Being” starts as “Quality”, but on (human)reflection, Quality turns into “Quantity”, and finally “Measure” which Hegel describes as “qualitative quantity”. Essence, for Hegel, is the “reflection” of Being in thought. It therefore consists of the interiority of Being. Everything, he says, has an Essence, that is, things really are not as they immediately present themselves. So through reflection, Being as originally conceived is discovered to be a sham. “Essence” starts as the “Ground of Existence”, for Being has to exist against a background, it developes into mere “Appearance”, and finally “Actuality”. Finally, we come to the Notion, which unifies Being with Essence. The Notion begins as “Subjective Notion”, (which Hegel explores, showing it to embrace versions of the traditional syllogism). This turns into the “Object” (which again develops, via “Mechanism” and “Chemism” into “Teleology”). The Subjective and Objective Notions are then reconciled, finally in the “Idea” which is the unity of subject and object and which embraces both Being and Essence. In the Notion, therefore, Being, (as it at first presents itself) and the Essence (revealed though reflection) – the outside and the inside - are united in the Idea. This recurrent threefold approach, found in the progression from Being to Essence and thence to Notion are found to exist in such other concepts as Quantity, Measure, Appearance etc – which arise in the course of the discussion. In each case, the third item in a triad is a unification of the other two opposed items. It appears too that Hegel’s philosophy unites two other important and disparate elements, namely structure and process, not really discussed here, but apparently present. On the one hand, the Notion is a structured totality, but on the other the Notion is also the outcome of a process. He occasionally uses metaphors derived from biology (buds and plants)and also unravelling rope. This same dichotomy can be found in other thinkers, for example, in Aristotle’s Poetics, in which the theatrical drama is seen on the one hand as a “unity” or “organism”, in which the parts combine into a whole; but on the other hand in which he sees the play as a tangle of threads which become disentangled. Interestingly Crick and Watson see DNA in a similar manner as a skein of threads which become disentangled and entangled, thus producing a succession of discrete organisms. My understanding of the Tao is that it too (in this case, however, using images of flowing water rather than rope and plants)unites ideas of flux and structure. I am dimly aware that other thinkers (Marx, famously, but also Kierkegaard and others?) have criticised or modified Hegel’s thought. I shall not, however, attempt to do any such thing here myself. Understanding this impossible book was difficult enough. Even yet, I’m not sure I understand it completely or properly. If is full of complicated nooks and crannies, which could take for ever to understand. All the same, it was an interesting exercise to write the review, even if posting it reveals me as an amateur.

  5. 4 out of 5

    Jason

    Read this book as poetry. Open to any line, read it a few times, swish it around in your brain, then spit it out - if you can! Kick this book, throw it against the wall, pick it up and cry over it. A life changer, a mind-buster. The great Hegel at his best, his deepest, and his most profound. Go for it - if you dare!

  6. 5 out of 5

    Erik Graff

    I've taken two courses specifically focused on the work of Hegel. The first was taught by a visiting French-Swiss professor at Union Theological Seminary, Henri Matuse. The primary focus of that class was on The Phenomenology of Geist while a secondary focus was on the Kojeve's analysis of its description of the Master-Slave dialectic, presenting, as it does, access to Marx's appropriation of Hegel. The seminary course was excellent primarily because of the composition of the class which, while s I've taken two courses specifically focused on the work of Hegel. The first was taught by a visiting French-Swiss professor at Union Theological Seminary, Henri Matuse. The primary focus of that class was on The Phenomenology of Geist while a secondary focus was on the Kojeve's analysis of its description of the Master-Slave dialectic, presenting, as it does, access to Marx's appropriation of Hegel. The seminary course was excellent primarily because of the composition of the class which, while small, had students of various ages, nationalities and backgrounds. Matuse was very good at facilitating conversation. My own background was in Kant while others had much more Marxist and contemporary European backgrounds. While the importance they placed on Kojeve rather escaped me, the close reading of the Phenomenology was quite exciting. What Hegel offers and Kant lacks is commonly said to be the application of dialectic to history. In fact, the real difference is, in my opinion, more along the lines of religion than along those of history. Hegel's Phenomenology, and his later Philosophy of Right, represents thinking in several dimensions, all of which are treated as having teleological implications. Thinking is at once (a) the thinking of philosophers as in the history of philosophy, (b) the thinking of whole civilizations as in their cultural manifestations and histories, & (c) the thinking of the Logos which stands behind both phenomenal domains as both their beginning and their end. In all three dimensions there is progress towards an omega point, an end, which is the Spirit realizing itself in its fulness. Philosophers naturally have a certain pride of place because they comprehend the history and can, to some extent, prefigure its culmination. This is, of course, an enormously conceited view of things and an almost incredibly optimistic one. It assumes, for one thing, that nothing important is lost despite such setbacks, say, as the genocidal extermination of certain cultures or the not-entirely-misnamed Dark Ages in Europe. It also employs, rather sneakily I think, all the emotions associated with certain sanguine traditions of Judaeo-Christianity to support its faith in progress towards some great good. In essence, Hegel is a mystic and a gnostic, seeing the macrocosm (god, the ground of being) embodied in the microcosm (the minds of individuals, particularly philosophers). Kant was mystical too, but his mysticism is of a different sort, not so much the incorporatist via positiva as the via negativa. So, too, were their respective appropriations of Christianity. With Hegel, the divine plan can be seen reflected in the creation of the Prussian state and its elevation of such a one as Hegel to fullest academic honors. With Kant, the divine is more to be seen as a very private thing: a solitary in prayer or meditation, as the haunting image of the Good crucified. I found Hegel's very conceit to be fascinating, fascinating enough to go on to read Stace's approving study of him; to reread the Phenomenology in a different translation and in a different, and far inferior, course; and to proceed to read a number of his other books such as this, the first part of his Encylopaedia. Although I started the Logic in Norway upon graduation from seminary, I only finished it upon return to the States. It was much tougher going than the Phenomenology because it was at a much higher level of abstraction and was far more dense. The Phenomenology abounds in examples. The Logic is a series of logical--or one might say, critically, linguistic--expositions. I wouldn't recommend it to any except those truly interested in Hegel.

  7. 4 out of 5

    Anthony Bloor

    An excelent book for insomniacs. I read it once, grasped little, read it again, and had glimpses of an understanding. Then I looked at my notes two or three months later... Think it needs another read. I bought this book when I was studying logic as part of a degree course in pure mathematics. It has no connection with mathematical logic. Or even logic? I think it's more about God than anything else, but I would have to look at my notes again. Meanwhile, I've read god-knows-how-many novels and n An excelent book for insomniacs. I read it once, grasped little, read it again, and had glimpses of an understanding. Then I looked at my notes two or three months later... Think it needs another read. I bought this book when I was studying logic as part of a degree course in pure mathematics. It has no connection with mathematical logic. Or even logic? I think it's more about God than anything else, but I would have to look at my notes again. Meanwhile, I've read god-knows-how-many novels and non-fiction in the interim...

  8. 4 out of 5

    Bene

    Just wonderful.

  9. 4 out of 5

    Franklin

    I went and told everyone that this was "relatively easy, for Hegel." Then they started reading it. Uh-oh I went and told everyone that this was "relatively easy, for Hegel." Then they started reading it. Uh-oh

  10. 5 out of 5

    Zack M

    I skim-read (or rather listened) to this, rather than studying it closely. Contraversial review below! Lots of people say lots of positive things about him, or the importance of his ideas on influencing other things. It helped me to get a flavour, enough to make me think that a) I'd like to read more of his stuff, more closely, at some point, b) it isn't necessary to understand hegel to be a good Marxist. It is difficult, in large part because it is badly written, and in significant part because o I skim-read (or rather listened) to this, rather than studying it closely. Contraversial review below! Lots of people say lots of positive things about him, or the importance of his ideas on influencing other things. It helped me to get a flavour, enough to make me think that a) I'd like to read more of his stuff, more closely, at some point, b) it isn't necessary to understand hegel to be a good Marxist. It is difficult, in large part because it is badly written, and in significant part because of his spiritual stuff. I felt as though one quarter i understood and found interesting, one quarter i understood and disagreed with. Of the interesting stuff, much - but not all - could be picked up from more recent thinkers, or general understanding. Of the remaining half, perhaps one third i felt that I couldn't understand because I haven't studied closely enough and it is difficult, one third because its incredibly badly or vaguely written, and one third because he's just wrong. I can see why there are such divergent opinions of him. -- A friend asked me to choose my favourite quotes. I struggled to find anything concise, but some: (1) With the positive we return to identity, but in its higher truth as identical self-relation, and at the same time with the note that it is not the negative. The negative per se is the same as difference itself. The identical as such is primarily the yet uncharacterised: the positive on the other hand is what is self-identical, but with the mark of antithesis to an other. And the negative is difference as such, characterised as not identity. This is the difference of difference within its own self. Positive and negative are supposed to express an absolute difference. The two however are at bottom the same: the name of either might be transferred to the other. Thus, for example, debts and assets are not two particular, self-subsisting species of property. What is negative to the debtor, is positive to the creditor. A way to the east is also a way to the west. Positive and negative are therefore intrinsically conditioned by one another, and are only in relation to each other. The north pole of the magnet cannot be without the south pole, and vice versâ. If we cut a magnet in two, we have not a north pole in one piece, and a south pole in the other. Similarly, in electricity, the positive and the negative are not two diverse and independent fluids. In opposition, the different is not confronted by any other, but by its other. Usually we regard different things as unaffected by each other. Thus we say: I am a human being, and around me are air, water, animals, and all sorts of things. Everything is thus put outside of every other. But the aim of philosophy is to banish indifference, and to ascertain the necessity of things. By that means the other is seen to stand over against its other. Thus, for example, inorganic nature is not to be considered merely something else than organic nature, but the necessary antithesis of it. Both are in essential relation to one another; and the one of the two is, only in so far as it excludes the other from it, and thus relates itself thereto. ... (2) Instead of speaking by the maxim of Excluded Middle (which is the maxim of abstract understanding) we should rather say: Everything is opposite. -- Mechanism, the first form of objectivity, is also the category which primarily offers itself to reflection, as it examines the objective world. It is also the category beyond which reflection seldom goes. It is, however, a shallow and superficial mode of observation, one that cannot carry us through in connexion with Nature and still less in connexion with the world of Mind. In Nature it is only the veriest abstract relations of matter in its inert masses which obey the law of mechanism. On the contrary the phenomena and operations of the province to which the term 'physical' in its narrower sense is applied, such as the phenomena of light, heat, magnetism, and electricity, cannot be explained by any mere mechanical processes, such as pressure, impact, displacement of parts, and the like. Still less satisfactory is it to transfer these categories and apply them in the field of organic nature; at least if it be our aim to understand the specific features of that field, such as the growth and nourishment of plants, or, it may be, even animal sensation. It is at any rate a very deep-seated, and perhaps the main, defect of modern researches into nature, that, even where other and higher categories than those of mere mechanism are in operation, they still stick obstinately to the mechanical laws; although they thus conflict with the testimony of unbiassed perception, and foreclose the gate to an-adequate knowledge of nature. But even in considering the formations in the world of Mind, the mechanical theory has been repeatedly invested with an authority which it has no right to. -- Nothing, if it be thus immediate and equal to itself, is also conversely the same as Being is. The truth of Being and of Nothing is accordingly the unity of the two: and this unity is Becoming.... philosophical knowledge is undoubtedly distinct in kind from the mode of knowledge best known in common life, as well as from that which reigns in the other sciences. But if to have no notion merely means that we cannot represent in imagination the oneness of Being and Nought, the statement is far from being true; for every one has countless ways of envisaging this unity. To say that we have no such conception can only mean, that in none of these images do we recognise the notion in question, and that we are not aware that they exemplify it. The readiest example of it is Becoming.; Every one has a mental idea of Becoming, and will[Pg 166] even allow that it is one idea: he will further allow that, when it is analysed, it involves the attribute of Being, and also what is the very reverse of Being, viz. Nothing: and that these two attributes lie undivided in the one idea: so that Becoming is the unity of Being and Nothing.—Another tolerably plain example is a Beginning. In its beginning, the thing is not yet, but it is more than merely nothing, for its Being is already in the beginning. Beginning is itself a case of Becoming; only the former term is employed with an eye to the further advance.—If we were to adapt logic to the more usual method of the sciences, we might start with the representation of a Beginning as abstractly thought, or with Beginning as such, and then analyse this representation, and perhaps people would more readily admit, as a result of this analysis, that Being and Nothing present themselves as undivided in unity. -- But when the Dialectical principle is employed by the understanding separately and independently,—especially as seen in its application to philosophical theories, Dialectic becomes Scepticism; in which the result that ensues from its action is presented as a mere negation.... Dialectic is different from 'Reflection.' ... We say, for instance, that man is mortal, and seem to think that the ground of his death is in external circumstances only; so that if this way of looking were correct, man would have two special properties, vitality and—also—mortality. But the true view of the matter is that life, as life, involves the germ of death, and that the finite, being radically self-contradictory, involves its own self-suppression. Nor, again, is Dialectic to be confounded with mere Sophistry. The essence of Sophistry lies in giving authority to a partial and abstract principle, in its isolation, as may suit the interest and particular situation of the individual at the time. For example, a regard to my existence, and my having the means of existence, is a vital motive of conduct, but if I exclusively emphasise this consideration or motive of my welfare, and draw the conclusion that I may steal or betray my country, we have a case of Sophistry. ... Take as an illustration the motion of the heavenly bodies. At this moment the planet stands in this spot, but implicitly it is the possibility of being in another spot; and that possibility of being otherwise the planet brings into existence by moving. Similarly the 'physical' elements prove to be Dialectical. The process of meteorological action is the exhibition of their Dialectic. It is the same dynamic that lies at the root of every other natural process, and, as it were, forces nature out of itself. ... Every one knows how the extremes of pain and pleasure pass into each other: the heart overflowing with joy seeks relief in tears, and the deepest melancholy will at times betray its presence by a smile. (2) Scepticism should not be looked upon merely as a doctrine of doubt. It would be more correct to say that the Sceptic has no doubt of his point, which is the nothingness of all finite existence. He who only doubts still clings to the hope that his doubt may be resolved, and that one or other of the definite views, between which he wavers, will turn out solid and true. Scepticism properly so called is a very different thing: it is complete hopelessness about all which understanding counts stable, and the feeling to which it gives birth is one of unbroken calmness and inward repose... It is only the finite thought of abstract understanding which has to fear Scepticism, because unable to withstand it: philosophy includes the sceptical principle as a subordinate function of its own, in the shape of Dialectic... The sceptic mistakes the true value of his result, when he supposes it to be no more than a negation pure and simple. For the negative, which emerges as the result of dialectic, is, because a result, at the same time the positive: it contains what it results from, absorbed into itself, and made part of its own nature. Thus conceived, however, the dialectical stage has the features characterising the third grade of logical truth, the speculative form, or form of positive reason. -- In Empiricism lies the great principle that whatever is true must be in the actual world and present to sensation. This principle contradicts that 'ought to be' on the strength of which 'reflection' is vain enough to treat the actual present with scorn and to point to a scene beyond—a scene which is assumed to have place and being only in the understanding of those who talk of it. No less than Empiricism, philosophy (§ 7) recognises only what is, and has nothing to do with what merely ought to be and what is thus confessed not to exist. On the subjective side, too, it is right to notice the valuable principle of freedom involved in Empiricism. For the main lesson of Empiricism is that man must see for himself and feel that he is present in every fact of knowledge which he has to accept. When it is carried out to its legitimate consequences, Empiricism—being in its facts limited to the finite sphere—denies the super-sensible in general, or at least any knowledge of it which would define its nature; it leaves thought no powers except abstraction and formal universality and identity. But there is a fundamental delusion in all scientific empiricism. It employs the metaphysical categories of matter, force, those of one, many, generality, infinity, &c.; following the clue given by these categories it proceeds to draw conclusions, and in so doing pre-supposes and applies the syllogistic form. And all the while it is unaware that it contains metaphysics—in wielding which, it makes use of those categories and their combinations in a style utterly thoughtless and uncritical…. In order to form experiences, Empiricism makes especial use of the form of Analysis. In the impression of sense we have a concrete of many elements, the several attributes of which we are expected to peel off one by one, like the coats of an onion. In thus dismembering the thing, it is understood that we disintegrate and take to pieces these attributes which have coalesced, and add nothing but our own act of disintegration. Yet analysis is the process from the immediacy of sensation to thought: those attributes, which the object analysed contains in union, acquire the form of universality by being separated. Empiricism therefore labours under a delusion, if it supposes that, while analysing the objects, it leaves them as they were: it really transforms the concrete into an abstract. And as a consequence of this change the living thing is killed: life can exist only in the concrete and one. Not that we can do without this division, if it be our intention to comprehend. Mind itself is an inherent division. The error lies in forgetting that this is only one-half of the process, and that the main point is the re-union of what has been parted.

  11. 5 out of 5

    Benjamin

    "When, as now, the notion is called the truth of Being and Essence, we must expect to be asked, why we do not begin with the notion? The answer is that, where knowledge by thought is our aim, we cannot begin with the truth, because the truth, when it forms the beginning, must rest on mere assertion. The truth when it is thought must as such verify itself to thought. If the notion were put at the head of Logic, and defined, quite correctly in point of content, as the unity of Being and Essence, t "When, as now, the notion is called the truth of Being and Essence, we must expect to be asked, why we do not begin with the notion? The answer is that, where knowledge by thought is our aim, we cannot begin with the truth, because the truth, when it forms the beginning, must rest on mere assertion. The truth when it is thought must as such verify itself to thought. If the notion were put at the head of Logic, and defined, quite correctly in point of content, as the unity of Being and Essence, the following question would come up: What are we to think under the terms ‘Being’ and ‘Essence’, and how do they come to be embraced in the unity of the Notion? But if we answered these questions, then our beginning with the notion would be merely nominal. The real start would be made with Being, as we have here done: with this difference, that the characteristics of Being as well as those of Essence would have to be accepted uncritically from figurate conception, whereas we have observed Being and Essence in their own dialectical development and learnt how they lose themselves in the unity of the notion." pp.222

  12. 5 out of 5

    Christine Cordula Dantas

    Um livro muito frustrante e impenetrável, exceto, possivelmente, para leitores muito bem preparados, que já passaram por uma introdução adequada aos pensamentos de Hegel. Essa edição apresenta apenas excertos, e embora tenham sido provavelmente bem selecionados, talvez não sejam uma boa idéia para esse tipo de obra que, pela importância e complexidade, merece uma edição completa, com uma apresentação aprofundada.

  13. 4 out of 5

    Michael

    I read this as an independent study at Villanova. This was a good introduction to Hegel's philosophy and his evaluation of the fundamental concepts of philsophy through the dialectical prism. I read this as an independent study at Villanova. This was a good introduction to Hegel's philosophy and his evaluation of the fundamental concepts of philsophy through the dialectical prism.

  14. 4 out of 5

    Simon

    Hegel is difficult to understand, but I once I got into this book I found it illuminating. There is no doubt that he was one of the greatest philosophers of all time.

  15. 4 out of 5

    Tyler

    Relatively easy, for Hegel. Uh-oh ...

  16. 5 out of 5

    Tim Newcomb

    Encyclopaedia of the Philosophic Sciences / Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, 1817 The Enzyklopädie contains abridged versions of his entire Dialectical model broken down in three sections- the Wissenschaft der Logik, Natur und Geistes. His 1812 work Wissenschaft der Logik (the "greater logic") covers his understanding of Philosophy, Logic and Reason which is summarized in part I of the Encyclopedia, and his 1807 Phänomenologie expands upon Geist more thoroughly than part III, so Encyclopaedia of the Philosophic Sciences / Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften, 1817 The Enzyklopädie contains abridged versions of his entire Dialectical model broken down in three sections- the Wissenschaft der Logik, Natur und Geistes. His 1812 work Wissenschaft der Logik (the "greater logic") covers his understanding of Philosophy, Logic and Reason which is summarized in part I of the Encyclopedia, and his 1807 Phänomenologie expands upon Geist more thoroughly than part III, so here I will focus on his understanding and influence on Socioeconomics, particularly the 'inverted' Hegelian Dialectics of Marx. Hegel is a relatively obscure philosopher due partly to the unmanageable applicability of his ideas to a broad range of fields- influencing Theology, Sociology, Economics, Politics, Psychology and other fields. There are not many other thinkers who have influenced such a spectrum of fields simultaneously and in opposite directions. His philosophy has been championed by far left and far right political ideologues, both believing themselves to be true Hegelians. The champions of nationalsocialismus argued they were true Hegelians who were implemented Hegel's vision of a perfectly rational society. Today's internet Social Justice Warriors utilizing a Facoutian understanding of human relationships share with White Nationalists a common Marxo-Hegelian Anthropological model- becoming inverted mirror images of each other. If one were to look at Hegel's followers alone- a dizzying array of Humanitarians, genocidal dictators, Anarchists, Nationalists and Economists of all stripes- one could never reverse-engineer what Hegel actually taught. But we can narrow the aperture down to a few ideological paths that are critical to understanding modern Western society today- and herein lies the importance of reading Hegel. The evolution of Hegel's Dialectical Idealism into Marx's Dialectical Materialism can be seen as Marx's adoption of the Master and Slave Dialectic from the Phenomenology without the transcendental elements (save a nearly mystical definition of the 'slave' category, which he maintained despite his return to Rationalism). You see Marx maintaining Hegel's nearly spiritual praise of the oppressed: '[the slave] will withdraw into itself and be transformed into a truly independent consciousness" (PS S 193). When the consciousness moves through the Master and Slave Dialectic, it arrives at Stoicism, then escapes to Skepticism, and then becomes the "Unhappy Consciousness" of the modern consciousness. Yet Marx pulls out this aspect of the Dialectic and moves it from the domain of abstract, metaphysical philosophizing about Qualia into a purely Materialistic Socioeconomic domain, a kind of Epistemological error which Hegel warns against. As the first among the 'left Hegelians' who learned Hegelian Dialectics through the lectures of Eduard Gans, Marx copied and inverted (and also I would add- defiled and misrepresented) Hegelian's entire Metaphysical model. This inversion is captured flawlessly by this line by Marx: "It is not the consciousness of people that determines their being, but, conversely, their social being [Material existence] that determines their consciousness." // "Es ist nicht das Bewusstsein der Menschen, das ihr Sein, sondern umgekehrt ihr gesellschaftliches Sein, das ihr Bewusstsein bestimmt." Replacing the loci of human consciousness from Ideology to Economics, Marx also rips the heart out of Hegelian Ontology and only keeps the strawman superstructure of the historical thesis-antithesis-synthesis model. Marx and Engels inverted Hegel in a insipidly obtuse manner. Marx openly boasts about de-mystifying Hegel- which removed the crucial element which holds his dialectics together. The mystical unity of Geist is the linchpin of Hegelian thinking- remove it and you have no evolution beyond Stoic/ Platonic/ Aristotelian logic. Half of the Logik is dedicated to exposing the errors and dangers of applying the form of reason without the object/context of that reasoning, which is exactly what Marx boasts about doing: "My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite... With me, on the contrary, the ideal is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of thought. The mystifying side of Hegelian dialectic I criticized nearly thirty years ago, at a time when it was still the fashion... The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious manner. With him it is standing on its head. It must be turned right side up again, if you would discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell." Instead of abstract beliefs about the nature of reality driving our existence, Marx inverted this to argue Economics is at the foundation of our reality from which everything else derives. To identify the metaphysical errors committed by Marx, I would argue you do not need to go outside of Hegel. Despite being downstream from Hegel, Marx did not take Hegel's warnings to heart, and perverted and misrepresented his core points. Within Hegel's Encyclopedia, we have a perfect reply to Marx's Hegelian Strawman of Historical Materialism: "A philosophy without heart and a faith without intellect are abstractions from the true life of knowledge and faith. The man whom philosophy leaves cold, and the man whom real faith does not illuminate, may be assured that the fault lies in them, not in knowledge and faith. The former is still an alien to philosophy, the latter an alien to faith." Hegel is quite cut-throat in his condemnation of self-made Social Justice ideologues, warning against the self-destructing fallacies of Egalitarianism, which I would argue Marx & Co. in their well-meaning Collectivism commit: "The heartthrob for the welfare of mankind passes therefore into the rage of frantic self-conceit, into the fury of consciousness to preserve itself from destruction... it therefore speaks of the universal order as a perversion of the law of the heart and ist happiness, a perversion invented by fanatical priests, gluttonous despots and their minions, who compensate themselves for their own degradation by degrading an oppressing others, a perversion which has led to the nameless misery of deluded mankind" (PS S 377) He also extensively diatribes against Collectivist ideologies who see individuals according to the categories to which they belong instead of seeing individuals as the most essential and fundamental unit of society: "The idea of bringing good into existence by means of the sacrifice of individuality is abandoned; for individuality is precisely the actualizing of what exists only in principle, and the perversion ceases to be regarded as a perversion of the good, for it is in fact really the conversion of the good as a mere End, into an actual existence: the movement of individuality is the reality of the universal." (PS S 390-91) Hegel's description "The idea of bringing good into existence by means of the sacrifice of individuality" is a flawless description of the catastrophic Egalitarian Socioeconomic ideas of the 20th and late 19th centuries which placed the social equity and the "greater good" over individual rights and immediately manifested the greatest Genocides the human species has ever known. It should be pointed out that while Marx's errors are most proudly committed on the left, they have kaleidoscoped through history in asymetrical ways, and are often now found in their reactionary counterparts. The purist versions of consumerist, materialistic Capitalism commit the same metaphysical flaws as Communism and Socialism; and much of our traditional storytelling in the Anglosphere warns about the Phenomenological ramifications of unfettered Capitalism on relationships. Think about classics all the way from 'A Christmas Carol' to modern movies like Hook and The Grinch; all of these warn against the unintentional American adoption of Marxist Materialism. You hear self-described Entrepreneurial types saying "persuasion is a part of everything" and assert that the purpose of working is "building the life you want to live". To this aim they pursue 'health and wealth' as the penultimate goal of labor, and yet while explicitly mocking Socialism of all stripes and deliberately conflating the varieties, they are (in their blind reactionism) implicitly adopting Marxist Metaphysiks. The same types who decry Cultural and Economic Marxism are unwittingly building their worldview on the Marxo-Hegelian dialectic of Historical Materialism. As Zizek points out, this obtuse worldview starts to mirror its perceived antithesis in an inverted but equal image. Those who roll their eyes at Socialism the most are often more Marxist in their Anthropological and Historical Metaphysiks (weltbild) than the actual self-described Marxists. Even in the parts of society that praise Marx, there are contradictions. For instance, the paradox of being Marxist and an Intersectional Feminist- when Marx and Engels extensively argued that the Patriarchy can only be defeated by a Capitalist system creating a wealthy leading class: "The Bougeoisie, where ever it has got the upper hand, has put an end to every feudal, patriarchal, idealism relations" (The Communist Manifesto Part I). Marx was also tremendously Anti-Semitic, yet today's 'Anti-Racists' are invariably proud Marxists. The contrast between what Marx actually taught and Marx's followers puts on display the demagoguery of modern politics; there is little authentic intellectualism happening; it is nearly entirely Intrapersonal Reactionism, Contrarianism, post-religious grasping for purpose and emotional displacement of unresolved personal relational issues onto social issues. Hence the ideological paths through history from Hegel and Marx to the present day are a bit disjointed. ------- Hegelian Weld: Phänomenologie des Geistes/ Phenomenology of Spirit [PS] (1807): https://bit.ly/3vkt5tI Wissenschaft der Logik/ Science of Logic [SL] (1812): https://bit.ly/3oS0fwo Enzyklopädie/ Encyclopaedia [EN] (1817): https://bit.ly/3awanWC Philosophie des Rechts/ Philosophy of Right [PR] (1820): https://bit.ly/3v4V80f Philosophie der Weltgeschichte/ Philosophy of History (1822): https://bit.ly/3w6GBBP Vorlesungen über die Ästhetik/ Lectures on Aesthetics(1818-1829): https://bit.ly/38V7VJj

  17. 4 out of 5

    Tasshin Fogleman

    Read sections 79-89 for seminar. Would love to go back to the beginning.

  18. 4 out of 5

    Kyle

    This book fucked me up. It was the most demanding book I’ve ever read, and I’ve read PhG and PR. I am not sure if I’m in and for my self, or actualized, or raised to the certainty of truth. But I’ve followed the Idea of the course of its self determination, and it’s otherness from itself was overcome. Or something.

  19. 5 out of 5

    Grant Black

    “What is Hegel trying to do? He is talking about new ideas. His dialectic is new, a new way of organizing thought. Not of thinking. But of knowing what you do when you think.” -CLR James

  20. 4 out of 5

    I invite lunch

    The book is very dificult to understand

  21. 4 out of 5

    Aaron Schuschu

    Read about a third of it. Man is a thinking creature; and because of that, thesis, antithesis, synthesis makes sense- according to Hegel. Also, how is thesis, antithesis, synthesis a mischaracterization of his ideas when that’s the main point? It’s a shame I got bored with it before he even got into his views on history- why I came to this party anyway. Update: I picked it back up and finished it about a year later as I was bored out of my mind but basically, it went from the point where I left i Read about a third of it. Man is a thinking creature; and because of that, thesis, antithesis, synthesis makes sense- according to Hegel. Also, how is thesis, antithesis, synthesis a mischaracterization of his ideas when that’s the main point? It’s a shame I got bored with it before he even got into his views on history- why I came to this party anyway. Update: I picked it back up and finished it about a year later as I was bored out of my mind but basically, it went from the point where I left it, to dissing Kant, to referencing Fichte and Aristotle, to references to Leibniz and Spinoza to the point of convincing me that Deleuze wrote about this to the point of Zizek feeling a way about what Deleuze wrote, and then arriving back to the beginning. There was even a few mentions of multiplicity. And perhaps where Zizek gets his “and so on and so on”.

  22. 5 out of 5

    ZaRi

    Each of the parts of philosophy is a philosophical whole, a circle rounded and complete in itself. In each of these parts, however, the philosophical Idea is found in a particular specificality or medium. The single circle, because it is a real totality, bursts through the limits imposed by its special medium, and gives rise to a wider circle. The whole of philosophy in this way resembles a circle of circles. The Idea appears in each single circle, but, at the same time, the whole Idea is consti Each of the parts of philosophy is a philosophical whole, a circle rounded and complete in itself. In each of these parts, however, the philosophical Idea is found in a particular specificality or medium. The single circle, because it is a real totality, bursts through the limits imposed by its special medium, and gives rise to a wider circle. The whole of philosophy in this way resembles a circle of circles. The Idea appears in each single circle, but, at the same time, the whole Idea is constituted by the system of these peculiar phases, and each is a necessary member of the organisation.

  23. 5 out of 5

    Zoo Kim

    urgh...

  24. 4 out of 5

    Trey Kennedy

  25. 5 out of 5

    Mack Spragg

  26. 5 out of 5

    Olaf

  27. 4 out of 5

    Cecilia

  28. 5 out of 5

    Catachresis

  29. 4 out of 5

    Kate Priest

  30. 5 out of 5

    Myriel

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