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In this exploration of new territory between ethics and epistemology, Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower. Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes in philosophy, but in order to reveal the ethical dimension of our epistemic practices the focus m In this exploration of new territory between ethics and epistemology, Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower. Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes in philosophy, but in order to reveal the ethical dimension of our epistemic practices the focus must shift to injustice. Fricker adjusts the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. The book explores two different types of epistemic injustice, each driven by a form of prejudice, and from this exploration comes a positive account of two corrective ethical-intellectual virtues. The characterization of these phenomena casts light on many issues, such as social power, prejudice, virtue, and the genealogy of knowledge, and it proposes a virtue epistemological account of testimony. In this ground-breaking book, the entanglements of reason and social power are traced in a new way, to reveal the different forms of epistemic injustice and their place in the broad pattern of social injustice.


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In this exploration of new territory between ethics and epistemology, Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower. Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes in philosophy, but in order to reveal the ethical dimension of our epistemic practices the focus m In this exploration of new territory between ethics and epistemology, Miranda Fricker argues that there is a distinctively epistemic type of injustice, in which someone is wronged specifically in their capacity as a knower. Justice is one of the oldest and most central themes in philosophy, but in order to reveal the ethical dimension of our epistemic practices the focus must shift to injustice. Fricker adjusts the philosophical lens so that we see through to the negative space that is epistemic injustice. The book explores two different types of epistemic injustice, each driven by a form of prejudice, and from this exploration comes a positive account of two corrective ethical-intellectual virtues. The characterization of these phenomena casts light on many issues, such as social power, prejudice, virtue, and the genealogy of knowledge, and it proposes a virtue epistemological account of testimony. In this ground-breaking book, the entanglements of reason and social power are traced in a new way, to reveal the different forms of epistemic injustice and their place in the broad pattern of social injustice.

30 review for Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing

  1. 5 out of 5

    Don

    In a recent survey of current trends or fads in academic philosophy, one of the top 5 was the evolving work in epistemic injustice. The genesis of this trend started in 2007 when Miranda Fricker, then a professor in the Philosophy Department at Birkbeck, University of London shook the philosophical world with this book. Centering on the ethics of knowledge, Fricker focuses on the ethical injustice done to any person in his or her capacity as a knower - particularly in two forms: testimonial inju In a recent survey of current trends or fads in academic philosophy, one of the top 5 was the evolving work in epistemic injustice. The genesis of this trend started in 2007 when Miranda Fricker, then a professor in the Philosophy Department at Birkbeck, University of London shook the philosophical world with this book. Centering on the ethics of knowledge, Fricker focuses on the ethical injustice done to any person in his or her capacity as a knower - particularly in two forms: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. But, what do these mean exactly? Imagine you are listening to the testimony of an individual. Now imagine the same testimony from different individuals based on their age, sex, social status, race, command of the language, sexual preference, etc. Do you treat the same testimony with equal value? Do you give an inflated or deflated view of the individual's statement? Do your prejudices affect how much value you give the testimony of any individual? This is the essence of testimonial injustice - the hearer's credibility judgement is altered by both direct and residual prejudicial beliefs (think of Tom Robinson's testimony in To Kill a Mockingbird to the all-white jury - what is their perception of an African American in the deep south?). Additionally, you might be living in a society where a concept of sexual harassment, for example, has not been fully formed such that the ability to have testimonial statements by those suffering forms of sexual injustice do not have the necessary societal constructs to adequately understand or speak to it - this is a form of hermeneutical injustice. As the book progresses Fricker continues to build the logical arguments not only for these forms of injustice but also for the virtuous solutions on what might be considered just, testimonial listeners as well as a listener's hermeneutical social awareness. Unlike my review three books ago on the philosophical trend in speculative realism (not written by a philosopher), Fricker builds out her argument carefully and logically with discipline to serve as an excellent future foundation for feminist philosophers and philosophy in general. It is strikingly clear why she has created a trend in 21st century philosophy which may have paved a path to improved justice both for speakers and listeners in the world. One should note that this book is not an easy read requiring some diligence to get through it. But, the effort is worth it. 5 stars!

  2. 5 out of 5

    Maryam

    This book has changed my life! It helped me to understand that Testimonial Injustice has not been only my personal experience, it is rather a systematic process in the epistemic life of many people.

  3. 4 out of 5

    Jana Light

    Wow. This is a powerful book about the injustices we can perpetuate to the marginalized when we subconsciously or consciously allow our prejudices to rate others as less credible than they are. Fricker's two concepts of testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice are great additions to the field of virtue epistemology and to analyzing how we evaluate the testimony and claims of others. It brought up questions in me about how our online and anonymous interactions affect our ability (or inab Wow. This is a powerful book about the injustices we can perpetuate to the marginalized when we subconsciously or consciously allow our prejudices to rate others as less credible than they are. Fricker's two concepts of testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice are great additions to the field of virtue epistemology and to analyzing how we evaluate the testimony and claims of others. It brought up questions in me about how our online and anonymous interactions affect our ability (or inability) to correctly evaluate the credibility of those making claims. Twitter is full of claims and we rarely know much about the person behind them. Fricker's book is more about interpersonal interactions than pseudo-anonymous interactions on the internet, but it does shed some light on why the internet is an easy place for prejudices to run unchecked and why it is a medium that is not particularly conducive to the spread and identification of truth.

  4. 5 out of 5

    Bobby Fung

    The two concepts could've been elaborated without using a multitude of philosophical and psychological jargon. While testimonial injustice takes up six chapters, you can almost know what the author intends to say upon reading the first chapter. In general, the author keeps repeating herself in the remaining five chapters, by means of introducing more and more sophisticated terms. In a sharp contrast, the second concept, namely hermeneutical injustice, only takes up one chapter. This imbalance of The two concepts could've been elaborated without using a multitude of philosophical and psychological jargon. While testimonial injustice takes up six chapters, you can almost know what the author intends to say upon reading the first chapter. In general, the author keeps repeating herself in the remaining five chapters, by means of introducing more and more sophisticated terms. In a sharp contrast, the second concept, namely hermeneutical injustice, only takes up one chapter. This imbalance of content may signify the indelicacy of author's theoretical framework.

  5. 4 out of 5

    Lucas

    Tematizando dois fenômenos antigos que nunca foram propriamente nomeados e tratados, Fricker descreve a injustiça epistêmica a partir da injustiça testemunhal e da injustiça hermenêutica. A partir de preconceitos historicamente erigidos e comunitariamente mantidos, relações de poder são sistematicamente repetidas e operadas. No interior delas, alguns testemunhos podem ser ignorados ou subestimados, ou, pior ainda, podem não haver palavras ou uma semântica que torne possível o compartilhamento de Tematizando dois fenômenos antigos que nunca foram propriamente nomeados e tratados, Fricker descreve a injustiça epistêmica a partir da injustiça testemunhal e da injustiça hermenêutica. A partir de preconceitos historicamente erigidos e comunitariamente mantidos, relações de poder são sistematicamente repetidas e operadas. No interior delas, alguns testemunhos podem ser ignorados ou subestimados, ou, pior ainda, podem não haver palavras ou uma semântica que torne possível o compartilhamento de certa experiência. O livro fala sobre essas formas de injustiça, ou seja, a falta de ressonância e de reconhecimento. Por fim, são oferecidas formas de justiça que enfrentem os horizontes injustos, míopes e surdos em que nos encontramos.

  6. 4 out of 5

    Maggie Roessler

    Testimonial justice is a basic ethical and epistemological virtue of truth. To have the virtue, we must try and succeed in adjusting our credibility assessments. The adjustment can be either naive, like Huckleberry Finn's, or corrective. If it's corrective, it can be either the result of active reflection or spontaneous. If it's spontaneous, it it was won either through personal familiarity with the informant or through experience. The virtue is probably best maintained through a combination of Testimonial justice is a basic ethical and epistemological virtue of truth. To have the virtue, we must try and succeed in adjusting our credibility assessments. The adjustment can be either naive, like Huckleberry Finn's, or corrective. If it's corrective, it can be either the result of active reflection or spontaneous. If it's spontaneous, it it was won either through personal familiarity with the informant or through experience. The virtue is probably best maintained through a combination of spontaneous and reflective adjustment. There are two forms of credibility assessment: unreflective and reflective. Both can be critical. The reliability of unreflective assessments is particularly susceptible to the social imagination, which guides the subject as emotions and visceral images born of diachronic and synchronic social residue. Unreflective assessment is essential to our cognitive heuristics, including in cases of testimony. The social imagination is a good starting point, should you try to set out to make yourself or others more testimonially just. (For the same idea, but with 'belief' as social imagination and 'acceptance' as reflection, see: Jennifer Church, "Taking it to heart") Testimonial justice is a third basic virtue of truth, next to Bernard Williams' Accuracy and Sincerity. She also uses the geneaological method influenced primarily by Craig's "Knowledge and the state of nature" to isolate those practices necessary to getting a pooling of information going in a state of nature. I don't think it's so likely though, that Testimonial Justice has the same status as Accuracy and Sincerity. Not because it's a virtue of the hearer rather than the speaker, that's all well and good, but too many societies have met their cognitive needs through a concept of knowledge without at all drawing on the benefits of Testimonial Justice. The same could not be said for Accuracy and Sincerity. The second form of epistemic injustice is hermeneutical injustice - the inability to explain oneself due to social hermeneutical marginalization. Like a credibility deficit, marginalization can be incidental or systematic, and can be a case of epistemic bad luck or an injustice. Example of overcoming hermeneutical marginilization: the speak outs organized by women during the second feminist movement. Finding words for sexual harassment and post-partum depression, for example, gave them the ability to act as reliable informants about these issues, and the power to insist on their positive credibility. I say, websites like www.dooce.com and http://jezebel.com/ and whatever the future internet world will bring are dynamiting those hermeneutical barriers to dust. These virtues and vices have political implications, but Fricker sticks with the epistemic and the moral evaluations.

  7. 4 out of 5

    Joeri

    This book effectively shows the relation between epistemology and ethics. As such, it can be regarded as dealing with the issue of epistemic duties. What's original about the book, is that it revolves around the epistemic duties we have not concerning our own believes, or as holders or conveyers of knowledge, but as hearers. Miranda Fricker shows that when we wrongly attribute a low level of credibility to a speaker, due to social stereotypes, or for structural reasons like our social imaginary This book effectively shows the relation between epistemology and ethics. As such, it can be regarded as dealing with the issue of epistemic duties. What's original about the book, is that it revolves around the epistemic duties we have not concerning our own believes, or as holders or conveyers of knowledge, but as hearers. Miranda Fricker shows that when we wrongly attribute a low level of credibility to a speaker, due to social stereotypes, or for structural reasons like our social imaginary order, political structure and social, racial and sexist prejudices, we do an injustice to that speaker. She calls us to behave in an epistemic more just manner, by correcting for these prejudices, but also hermeneutically, by stating that also interpreting justly is an ethical issue. She effectively shows that when we fail to do so, we harm others as possessors of knowledge, and thus dehumanize them, for to be a knower and be seen as such, is an important human value. And not only do we cause social harm then, but also epistemological harm: we might miss out on important knowledge by excluding people from contributing knowledge to our 'information/knowledge pool'. As long as certain people are still not taken seriously just due to their social background, this book will remain important. Neill DeGrasse Tyson once said: "To me, I am driven by two main philosophies: know more about the world than I knew yesterday and lessen the suffering of others. You'd be surpiresed how far that gets you." Having read this book, I have come to realize that knowing more about the world helps lessen the suffering of others, and, vice versa, that taking others seriously, might contribute to getting to know more about the world.

  8. 4 out of 5

    Ben

    Another example of where philosophy went wrong. The book is talking about pretty important ideas related to people understanding their own experience, and injustices that occur do to stereotypes of minorities, people not listening, etc. However, it's talked about in a pretty incomprehensible manner. The author postulates psychological mechanisms where she could have looked them up. You can get a much better understanding of stereotypes and how they work by reading a book on social cognition. Another example of where philosophy went wrong. The book is talking about pretty important ideas related to people understanding their own experience, and injustices that occur do to stereotypes of minorities, people not listening, etc. However, it's talked about in a pretty incomprehensible manner. The author postulates psychological mechanisms where she could have looked them up. You can get a much better understanding of stereotypes and how they work by reading a book on social cognition.

  9. 5 out of 5

    Justus

    This review is from the perspective of someone who is not deeply read in philosophy. Maybe someone who actually studied philosophy in university would come to a different conclusion. I found it extremely challenging -- and usually quite frustrating and unsatisfying -- to force myself to read through this. It is only 188 pages but it doesn't exactly fly by. In part that is because this is full of philosophical jargon. The author has no problem dropping sentences like It draws the subject away from This review is from the perspective of someone who is not deeply read in philosophy. Maybe someone who actually studied philosophy in university would come to a different conclusion. I found it extremely challenging -- and usually quite frustrating and unsatisfying -- to force myself to read through this. It is only 188 pages but it doesn't exactly fly by. In part that is because this is full of philosophical jargon. The author has no problem dropping sentences like It draws the subject away from assertoric caprice and towards doxastic stability. But the larger problem I had is that I often struggled to see what the point was during long sections and (sometimes) entire chapters. Fricker starts from an interesting position (which is what drew me to the book). The exploration is orientated not to justice, but rather to injustice. As Judith Shklar points out, philosophy talks a lot about justice, and very little about injustice....The focus on justice creates an impression that justice is the norm and injustice the unfortunate aberration. But, obviously, this may be quite false. It also creates the impression that we should always understand injustice negatively by way of a prior grasp of justice....My interest here is in injustice specifically in the sphere of epistemic activity, and certainly in this sphere I believe that there are areas where injustice is normal, and that the only way to reveal what is involved in epistemic justice (indeed, even to see that there is such a thing as epistemic justice) is by looking at the negative space that is epistemic injustice. Fricker focuses on a specific kind of injustice, "epistemic injustice", the key form of which is "testimonial injustice" and that important kind of that is "negative identity prejudice testimonial injustice". Which is to say, when someone discounts what someones says because of their group identity. When you ignore what Mary says because she's a woman and all women are hysterical and irrational. When you ignore what Tom says because he's black and black people are all thieves and liars. It's a bit....underwhelming, somehow? Fricker lays a lot of groundwork (persistent versus non-persistent, systematic versus non-systematic, culpable versus non-culpable) to get this point and you're mostly left feeling what's the big deal...obviously those are bad things. But, in the strongest section of the book ("Prejudice in the Credibility Economy"), Fricker explains the practical and the epistemic harm of this, as well as why she thinks it is important to have a framework for talking about the problem explicitly. A practical harm would be something like "in meetings men don't listen to my ideas so my career has become stuck". An epistemic harm would be something like "in meetings men don't listen to my ideas, so now I've lost confidence in my own beliefs and general intelligence". Set against this great section are the many less than great sections. The worst example is the entirety of chapter 3, where Fricker spends 20+ pages building a framework for how people actually receive testimony. If I tell you "the sky is blue" -- how exactly do you go about deciding that something like that is true or not? Do you actually apply fully logical thinking to every statement you hear? Do you just accept what everyone tells you uncritically? It is a good and interesting question but what is ridiculous about this chapter is that this is an entirely empirical question. And Fricker spends 20 pages in purely philosophical arguments without mention of a single MRI test or scientific experiment. Contrast this chapter to Thinking, Fast and Slow. One is the work of science and one is not. They actually come to similar conclusions but Fricker's is a waste of time, nothing but intellectual theorizing and the reason why philosophers have a bad name. Get out of your office and do some damn experiments! What is the solution to "negative identity prejudice testimonial injustice"? Again, after spending dozens of pages building up dense theories of epistemical virtue...Fricker's answer is to (somehow) know that you are prejudiced in a certain area. And then once you know you are prejudiced, you should pause and evaluate whether you are letting your prejudices color your perception of testimony you receive. As an example, imagine you grew up in a deeply patriarchal society but then study abroad in a more egalitarian society. When you return home after your studies you've realized you have lots of built-in biases about the testimony of women. So the next time a woman says something you should pause and think to yourself, "Am I discounting this simply because a woman is saying it, or are there actually solid, non-prejudiced reasons for discounting it?" Again...it all feels a bit....underwhelming somehow? Leaving me feeling that this is a book better left to professional philosophers who care deeply about the tiny nuances and dense theorizing that Fricker is doing.

  10. 5 out of 5

    Jonathon Jones

    Epistemic Injustice can be divided into two parts: Testimonial, and Hermeneutical. The first has to do with a listener giving a speaker less credibility than she deserves, especially when the reduced credibility has to do with a prejudice about the speaker (for example, that women are merely intuitive rather than rational and therefore less likely to know what they're talking about). The second has to do with the kinds of experience that can be understood in a culture - a person is at a disadvan Epistemic Injustice can be divided into two parts: Testimonial, and Hermeneutical. The first has to do with a listener giving a speaker less credibility than she deserves, especially when the reduced credibility has to do with a prejudice about the speaker (for example, that women are merely intuitive rather than rational and therefore less likely to know what they're talking about). The second has to do with the kinds of experience that can be understood in a culture - a person is at a disadvantage when the kinds of experience they are having are not easily categorized or understood by themselves and others. For example, without the concepts of sexual harassment, or postpartum depression, these things are harder to deal with, to explain, and to get help with. When the missing concepts are those that would be useful for an already disadvantaged group, that's where the injustice comes in. The author spends the vast majority of time on the first of these, exploring in detail how testimony in general is supposed to work and how it features in the epistemic life of listeners and speakers. Hermeneutical Injustice has only a single chapter at the end, and feels much less well developed. Which is unfortunate, because to me it is the more difficult to understand and also more interesting of the two. I wonder whether the book would have been better if it had stuck strictly to testimonial injustice, or instead split the book more evenly between the two concepts - as it was, I was disappointed in the short-shrift given to the latter. Still, I couldn't ask for anything more regarding testimonial injustice - it's really very carefully thought-through here. And each of these concepts has given me better language to understand some of the political dynamics happening in the world currently, so I am very appreciative of that!

  11. 4 out of 5

    Ross

    The tendency for incoherence in human prejudice, sustained through mechanisms of psychological compartmentalization, is such that significant pockets of epistemic trust can remain relatively untouched, even by a powerful racist ideology that corrupts that same trust in countless other contexts. I debated between giving the book 3 or 4 stars because much of it was illuminating and a lot of the ideas were helpful in uncovering some serious ethical problems in how people are treated. However, the bo The tendency for incoherence in human prejudice, sustained through mechanisms of psychological compartmentalization, is such that significant pockets of epistemic trust can remain relatively untouched, even by a powerful racist ideology that corrupts that same trust in countless other contexts. I debated between giving the book 3 or 4 stars because much of it was illuminating and a lot of the ideas were helpful in uncovering some serious ethical problems in how people are treated. However, the book was sometimes a little heavy on the jargon, which made the reading a bit stilted. I'm also not persuaded by her argument against and inferentialism or for virtue epistemology, which made some of the scaffolding for her account less secure for me. That being said, the book is still well worth reading—in fact, due to its impact, I would say it's required reading in modern social epistemology.

  12. 4 out of 5

    Mythenmetz

    Wichtiges Buch das im Rahmen einer Tugendethik entscheidende Leitlinien für die Beurteilung von epistemischen Unrecht entwirft und es gerade im Licht der aktuellen Debatten um die Sichtbarkeit von marginalisierten Gruppen versteht, streng analytische Erkenntnistheorie mit einem Bewusstsein von der Bedeutung sozialer Machtverhältnisse zu verbinden.

  13. 5 out of 5

    Jake Beardsley

    An unusually useful and accessible work of philosophy. I'd recommend anyone read at least the first & last chapters, or use a secondary source to learn the basic ideas. An unusually useful and accessible work of philosophy. I'd recommend anyone read at least the first & last chapters, or use a secondary source to learn the basic ideas.

  14. 4 out of 5

    Josh Cayetano

    A good framework, but Fricker’s analysis falls short of her intended goal.

  15. 4 out of 5

    Devyn Kennedy

    A good, if basic, way to understand how prejudice can cause us to do injustice to an individual. Certainly niche but a topic that is entirely important and worthy of further study.

  16. 4 out of 5

    Ella

    Possibly one of the most pretentious works I have ever read.

  17. 5 out of 5

    Elisefur

    Epistemic injustice is a thing. 最近在思考現實建構這件事,想起這本書裡面的幾段話: P168 關於Epistemic objectification 「就其本身而言,被視為物體對待並不是問題,我們可以是很多東西,其中也包括物體...但是這個脈絡並未否認他也是個主體;另一方面,某人被視為僅是一個物體—「僅是」意味著他們的主體性被更全面地否認。」 P174 「權力透過噤聲沒有權力的人,將他們排除在權威話語的管道之外,以建構現實的樣貌。」 P191 「...她們的經歷落入詮釋的裂縫中並非偶然。當她們孤立地掙扎以理解自身經歷的各種騷擾,集體社會意義的整體機制實際上是用來讓這些晦暗的經歷不為人所見。」 我覺得這指出了女性主義無法企及並且可能遭遇矛盾和排斥之處。 話語權爭奪無時無刻都在發生,任何宣稱和立場都會落入某種權力結構與社會關係(因而無處不政治),所以還是需要重新回到內在去探索與自我、與身體的關係(尤其是那些「晦暗的經歷」,讓自我與身體失衡與分割)去挖掘可能性與更有創造力的關係,不然始終會陷入這些既成現實(或至少某種關於現實的信念)的箝制。

  18. 5 out of 5

    Sue Lyle

    It is well worth the effort to read this book whether or not you are a philosopher. The book takes the familiar topic of justice and ethics in philosophy and using socially situated examples demonstrates how some people are treated unjustly just because of their membership of a socially powerless group. I like the way Fricker used 'To Kill a Mocking Bird' and 'The Talented Mr Ripley' to illustrate her arguments about credibility deficits leading to epistemic injustice as people's testimony is do It is well worth the effort to read this book whether or not you are a philosopher. The book takes the familiar topic of justice and ethics in philosophy and using socially situated examples demonstrates how some people are treated unjustly just because of their membership of a socially powerless group. I like the way Fricker used 'To Kill a Mocking Bird' and 'The Talented Mr Ripley' to illustrate her arguments about credibility deficits leading to epistemic injustice as people's testimony is downgraded (or sometimes upgraded). This means that some people are downgraded in Their capacities as knowers and by implication downgraded as a human being which amounts to injustice. Her account of the hermeneutic lacuna that makes some social groups vulnerable to Injustice which constitutes a cognitive handicap to all is well argued. Her examples from race and gender are helpful and she shows how the complexity of social Identity means the hermeneutical marginalisation affects individuals in a differentiated manner. This amounts to prejudice against people in virtue of their membership of a socially powerless group. The virtuous person has a responsibility to raise their awareness of their own tendency towards credibility deficit when listening to other voices and then to correct for this. This book therefore gives a new exposition of virtue ethics that is very important today.

  19. 5 out of 5

    Lisa

    A spectacular dive into the power of knowing, the relationship of a knower to the world, and knowledge to power. Fracker argues for the joint power of testimonial and hermeneutical justice to restore knowers to themselves and the world.

  20. 4 out of 5

    Justin

    It probably would have been a much shorter book if it weren't for all the examples. But I suppose they make the main threads more readable. Some of the definitions of this and that were rather non-sensical when read out of context. It probably would have been a much shorter book if it weren't for all the examples. But I suppose they make the main threads more readable. Some of the definitions of this and that were rather non-sensical when read out of context.

  21. 5 out of 5

    Julia Smith

    An important book for thinking ethically about identity, language, and valuing human persons as knowers in their own right.

  22. 4 out of 5

    MM

    Read this book!

  23. 4 out of 5

    Rachel

    Changed the way I think about subjectivity, voice, and understanding. Amazing!

  24. 4 out of 5

    Emily Sanders

  25. 4 out of 5

    Jacob

  26. 5 out of 5

    Jonathan Wood

  27. 4 out of 5

    Alice Olmstead

  28. 5 out of 5

    Roland

  29. 5 out of 5

    Mel

  30. 4 out of 5

    Bryan Norton

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