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A liberal society seeks not to impose a single way of life, but to leave its citizens as free as possible to choose their own values and ends. It therefore must govern by principles of justice that do not presuppose any particular vision of the good life. But can any such principles be found? And if not, what are the consequences for justice as a moral and political ideal? A liberal society seeks not to impose a single way of life, but to leave its citizens as free as possible to choose their own values and ends. It therefore must govern by principles of justice that do not presuppose any particular vision of the good life. But can any such principles be found? And if not, what are the consequences for justice as a moral and political ideal? These are the questions Michael Sandel takes up in this penetrating critique of contemporary liberalism. This new edition includes a new introduction and a new final chapter in which Professor Sandel responds to the later work of John Rawls.


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A liberal society seeks not to impose a single way of life, but to leave its citizens as free as possible to choose their own values and ends. It therefore must govern by principles of justice that do not presuppose any particular vision of the good life. But can any such principles be found? And if not, what are the consequences for justice as a moral and political ideal? A liberal society seeks not to impose a single way of life, but to leave its citizens as free as possible to choose their own values and ends. It therefore must govern by principles of justice that do not presuppose any particular vision of the good life. But can any such principles be found? And if not, what are the consequences for justice as a moral and political ideal? These are the questions Michael Sandel takes up in this penetrating critique of contemporary liberalism. This new edition includes a new introduction and a new final chapter in which Professor Sandel responds to the later work of John Rawls.

30 review for Liberalism and the Limits of Justice

  1. 4 out of 5

    Farah Al-Shuhail

    مجدداً عن الفلسفة الأخلاقية وكتاب آخر قد تود أن تخفي عنوانه عن أعين الغرباء حتى لا يرمقك أحدهم بنظرة مريبة عندما يراك تقرأه في قطار أو مكان عام. ما يعرفه قارئ هذا الكتاب ولا يعرفه الآخرين أنه موجه لنقد النظرية الليبرالية ومحاولة فرض رؤية جماعاتية عليها. لذلك ما من شيء يدعو إلى الإرتياب - أو حتى الدهشة - هنا. يبحث مايكل ساندل، أستاذ العلوم السياسية في جامعة هارفرد، في مدى صحة المقولة المفيدة بأن "المجتمع الليبرالي يترك لأفراده حرية اختيار القيم التي ترضيهم" ومدى تفريطه في روح الجماعة، وبالتأكيد أن مجدداً عن الفلسفة الأخلاقية وكتاب آخر قد تود أن تخفي عنوانه عن أعين الغرباء حتى لا يرمقك أحدهم بنظرة مريبة عندما يراك تقرأه في قطار أو مكان عام. ما يعرفه قارئ هذا الكتاب ولا يعرفه الآخرين أنه موجه لنقد النظرية الليبرالية ومحاولة فرض رؤية جماعاتية عليها. لذلك ما من شيء يدعو إلى الإرتياب - أو حتى الدهشة - هنا. يبحث مايكل ساندل، أستاذ العلوم السياسية في جامعة هارفرد، في مدى صحة المقولة المفيدة بأن "المجتمع الليبرالي يترك لأفراده حرية اختيار القيم التي ترضيهم" ومدى تفريطه في روح الجماعة، وبالتأكيد أن ينتقد الكاتب النظرية الليبرالية يعني أن يوجه نقداً قاسياً للنفعية التي قد يعدها البعض أحد اشكال الليبرالية المطلقة، نظرية أخلاق الواجب لدى كَنْت لم تسلم من النقد ايضاً. الكثير من الإنتقادات والإعتراضات في إطارها النظري، لا حلول عملية، لا أمثلة للقياس (ذكر مثالين لا يمكننا الإستفادة منهما في مجتمعاتنا الإسلامية)، لا رؤية شاملة قبل الفصل الأخير من الكتاب. يعتمد الكتاب ايضاً بشكل كلي على كتاب جون رولز "نظرية في العدالة" كذلك كتابه الآخر "الليبرالية السياسية"، وأخشى أن قراءة هذا الكتاب دون العودة لمؤلفات رولز هو ضرب من المجازفة (بالكاد استطعت التفريق بين آراء رولز وآراء الكاتب الأصلي). أود الإشارة ايضاً إلى أن الكاتب لم يبذل أي جهد في تبسيط مفرداته ولغته، ولا أجد مبرراً لذلك.

  2. 5 out of 5

    Jumanah

    إن المجتمعات الليبرالية تقام على أسس سياسية وما ينطلق منها أخلاقيًا في خدمة السياسة، ولكن كيف يمكن تأسيس مجتمع أخلاقي دون فرض "رؤية مسبقة للحياة الخيرة" ودون الإخلال بأسس المذهب الليبرالي أيضًا؟ هذا السؤال هو محور الكتاب التي يقلبها وينتقدها المؤلف مايكل سانديل، أستاذ العلوم السياسية في جامعة هارفرد، بين نظرية رولز ونوزيك وكانت للعدالة. بعيدًا عن تسطيح الليبرالية واستعمالها الخاطئ لتبرير رغبات طبيعية في الحياة الهنيئة يقارن المؤلف أبسط الموضوعات الليبرالية تدريجيًا من حرية الرأي والحرية الدينية إ إن المجتمعات الليبرالية تقام على أسس سياسية وما ينطلق منها أخلاقيًا في خدمة السياسة، ولكن كيف يمكن تأسيس مجتمع أخلاقي دون فرض "رؤية مسبقة للحياة الخيرة" ودون الإخلال بأسس المذهب الليبرالي أيضًا؟ هذا السؤال هو محور الكتاب التي يقلبها وينتقدها المؤلف مايكل سانديل، أستاذ العلوم السياسية في جامعة هارفرد، بين نظرية رولز ونوزيك وكانت للعدالة. بعيدًا عن تسطيح الليبرالية واستعمالها الخاطئ لتبرير رغبات طبيعية في الحياة الهنيئة يقارن المؤلف أبسط الموضوعات الليبرالية تدريجيًا من حرية الرأي والحرية الدينية إلى مسائل أكثر تعقيدًا موضحًا أن الليبرالية ليست موقفًا واحدًا منتهيًا بعد ذلك بنقده للآراء المطروحة. بعد قراءة هذا الكتاب أشعر بحاجة إلى تنهيدة عظيمة لأن القراءة ثقيلة والمفاهيم والمصطلحات جديدة بالنسبة لي. إضافة إلى ذلك، الموضوعات المطروحة معقدة وواجهة صعوبات كثيرة في فهم كل ما قرأت ولا أزعم أنني قد فهمت كل ما كُتب ولكنني بلا شك سأعود إلى الكتاب بعد ما أصل إلى مستوى أعلى منه. عمومًا أنصح به للمهتمين بهذا المجال ومن لهم خلفية سياسية وليس المبتدأ او الفضولي. جعة

  3. 5 out of 5

    Neal Alexander

    A critique of Rawls’ A Theory of Justice which aims - - successfully I think - - to show that the ‘veil of ignorance’ trope - - defining a just society prior to knowing one’s place in it - - can only work by denying that shared concepts and values are integral to our identities.

  4. 4 out of 5

    Steve

    Got 10 or so pages in, realized that I wasn't up to the work that was going to be required to read this book. Not indecipherable but I guess I'm getting a little lazy. Got 10 or so pages in, realized that I wasn't up to the work that was going to be required to read this book. Not indecipherable but I guess I'm getting a little lazy.

  5. 5 out of 5

    El señor O

    Reconstrucción la de teoría de justicia de Rawls. La mejor parte es la crítica al "yo" presupuesto en la posición original. Reconstrucción la de teoría de justicia de Rawls. La mejor parte es la crítica al "yo" presupuesto en la posición original.

  6. 4 out of 5

    Parisa Dabestani

    در این کتاب مایکل سندل به بررسی لیبرالیسم وظیفه‌گرایانه‌ی رالز که آن را بر مبنای عدالت بنا می‌‌کند می‌پردازد و نشان می‌دهد که چگونه مفروضات عدالت اصول فردگرایانه لیبرالیسم را مختل می‌کند.

  7. 5 out of 5

    Mistypane611

    I'm studying Public Choice and I found this book really useful for articulating the main reason I find that approach problematic. There isn't enough emphasis on debate and engagement. Towards the end of the book, in the part that updates the argument following 'Political Liberalism' Sandel sums it up perfectly for me "Whether a moral or political controversy reflects reasonable but incompatible conceptions of the good, or whether it can be resolved by due reflection and deliberation, can only be I'm studying Public Choice and I found this book really useful for articulating the main reason I find that approach problematic. There isn't enough emphasis on debate and engagement. Towards the end of the book, in the part that updates the argument following 'Political Liberalism' Sandel sums it up perfectly for me "Whether a moral or political controversy reflects reasonable but incompatible conceptions of the good, or whether it can be resolved by due reflection and deliberation, can only be determined by reflecting and deliberating. But this raises another difficulty with political liberalism. For the political life it describes leaves little room for the kind of public deliberation necessary to test the plausibility of contending comprehensive moralities - to persuade others of the merits of our moral ideals, to be persuaded by others of the merits of theirs."

  8. 4 out of 5

    سلمان

    المناقشة شيقة..الاعتراضات لها جانبها من الصحة،،بنهاية قراءة هذا الكتاب...زادت عندي الرؤية الشاملة للعدالة..ولازلت مؤمنا بالليبرالية كحل مثالي لتحقيقها..ليبرالية تتكيف مع الواقع .. وتتقبل النقد..لانه حرية:)

  9. 5 out of 5

    Curtis

    Definitely need to have read Rawls first to have any chance on this.

  10. 4 out of 5

    Michal Lipták

    Powerful and correct critique of liberalism as self-declared "default neutral". Much of this critique I have already worked out myself, but here it's presented by extremely detailed dissection of Rawls' now-archetypal A Theory of Justice, poking holes in its contradictions. In the end you see this (according to Sandel indeed admirable) effort "provokes discussion", but ultimately fails, and you are left with two options: either recast Rawls' argument once again as purely transcendentalist, or re Powerful and correct critique of liberalism as self-declared "default neutral". Much of this critique I have already worked out myself, but here it's presented by extremely detailed dissection of Rawls' now-archetypal A Theory of Justice, poking holes in its contradictions. In the end you see this (according to Sandel indeed admirable) effort "provokes discussion", but ultimately fails, and you are left with two options: either recast Rawls' argument once again as purely transcendentalist, or return constitutive power of community back into game. In other words, either Kant or Hegel. And let's say that times when I would've chosen Kant are long gone.

  11. 5 out of 5

    Sheldon

    The basis of the Rawls/Sandel debate is an interrogation of the relationship between justice and good. One wonders whether a society's principles of justice can be neutral in relation to the contradictory moral, religious and cultural conceptions that coexist in that society. There are two ways of conceiving this neutrality: (1) The idea that individuals have fundamental rights whose respect takes precedence over the general welfare (Kant, Nozick); (2) The idea that the justification of the princi The basis of the Rawls/Sandel debate is an interrogation of the relationship between justice and good. One wonders whether a society's principles of justice can be neutral in relation to the contradictory moral, religious and cultural conceptions that coexist in that society. There are two ways of conceiving this neutrality: (1) The idea that individuals have fundamental rights whose respect takes precedence over the general welfare (Kant, Nozick); (2) The idea that the justification of the principles of justice is not based on any conception of the good life (Rawls). The communitarian position is to criticize (2). There are two ways of conceiving of this criticism, i.e. of linking the articulation of principles of justice to the good, one that is communitarian (1') and another that is not necessarily communitarian (2'): (1') The idea that justice is deaf to community values, although there may be debate within the community as to which values best fit the community; (2') The idea that the justification of the principles of justice depends on the moral value of the purposes of these principles, regardless of whether or not the moral value of the purpose belongs to the community. (2') retranscribes the Aristotelian option of seeking the most desirable life to conform to the model constitution. (1') can be criticized in the same way as (1) insofar as these options avoid questioning the ends of the chosen principles of justice. The debate can be illustrated in the case of religious freedom: liberals defend it by virtue of the fact that the belief was freely acquired, but not by virtue of the moral value of that belief, defined as the set of behaviours and attitudes to which that belief leads the individual, who may not conceive of it as a free choice. Another justification of religious freedom, axiologically neutral as well, is to avoid a religious war; but this is not a moral justification. However, it is not up to the judge, in each case, to evaluate the moral value of the religious practice submitted to his examination: to the first principles of justice must therefore be added rules of evaluation. And yet, some judges have used the ultimate moral purpose of the problematic practice to challenge the rules of evaluation in some cases : Sandel reminds us of the case of Judge Frank Johnson who authorized the famous march of Martin Luther King from Selma to Montgomery (1965) when it had been banned by the Governor of Alabama on the grounds that states had the right to regulate the use of their highways and that a mass march on those highways exceeded what was constitutionally permissible: Judge Johnson referred to the "enormity of the wrongs to be protested" to overturn the Governor's decision (Williams v. Wallace). In short, Sandel contrasts the liberal, axiologically neutral conception of rights (which would, for example, permit a Nazi parade and a parade of civil rights activists alike) with a conception (2' ) "that wishes to base rights on a substantive moral judgment about the purposes that those same rights serve to promote", which is therefore also different from the communitarian option (1'), which would not prohibit the Nazi parade any more than the liberals would, because it recognizes the values of each community, the black community as well as the Nazi community. Sandel then opposes two strands of liberalism: a Kantian deontological liberalism (Fiat justitia pereat mundus) and a liberalism inherited from Mill. Kant writes in fact that the principles of justice are inferred independently of any particular conception of the good. The moral law is not valid by virtue of a moral end but by virtue of itself, which plays a regulating role in relation to other ends, whereas Mill subordinates justice to the pursuit of happiness, defined in terms of social utility. Kant rejects this conception, because to base morality on an empirical datum such as utility is to condemn it to be changeable and to risk drifts contrary to justice. Kant places the foundation of morality not in the object but in the subject. There is therefore in me both an object of experience and a substrate subject that is the condition of possibility of the experience and that is always anterior to it (and which therefore makes the exercise of autonomy possible). Sandel considers that this conception is too abstract, shows that Rawls tries to conceive a deontological and empirical liberalism, i.e. detached from this Kantian metaphysics, and that he fails. Rawls mainly supports the priority of the righteous over the good; this is his disagreement with the utilitarians, and the aspect by which he approaches Aristotle. The satisfaction of one's desires has no value in itself, and should be taken into account only if the purpose of the desire is in accordance with justice. Rawls argues that justice is a special value in that it is also the yardstick by which values are judged. It is the "value of values", the standard by which conflicting values are reconciled. This raises the question of the origin of this norm: if it is immanent to the values of society, it cannot exceed them; if it is abstract, it cannot be applied to them. The problem of justice is reflected in the epistemological conception of the subject: he should be endowed with dignity as the substratum of his choices and preferences. This "abstract" conception is indispensable to the deontological position. It introduces the "original position" of Rawls, the thought expriment of the veil of ignorance, which is Rawls's response to Kant. Because they do not know what makes them individuals, the actors of the experiment are pure "persons" in the sense that they have only what is universally given to all men (for example, they are rational) while keeping within themselves the possibility of future particularization in a society that does not yet exist. But this is the whole problem: justice does not emerge outside of an objective (scarcity of resources) and subjective (the pursuit of one's own good) context of conflict, which, as Hume's analysis shows, implies that there is another norm for situations of non-conflict (as for courage in war and tranquility in peace). This Humian view is consistent with Sandel's final critique of the Rawlsian disencumbered self in his conclusion, where he explains that the disencumbered self cannot be a moral subject in a community, because if it is only the contingent substratum of detached or detachable attributes, it cannot love or do good to others. In the long run, Sandel goes so far as to write that we could go beyond the present limitation of our knowledge of the good of others, which makes justice necessary, towards a "community" where precisely this knowledge would be possible (as it is between friends), and where justice would become superfluous. Paradoxically, there may indeed be an absence of justice in a context of supreme conflict (the Hobbesian state of nature e.g.) or in a system of understanding where affection predominates (family and friends), both of which are outside the law. Sandel's point is not to confuse society and family but to show that there are relevant contexts for the application of justice as a virtue, which relativizes its status as an overriding norm. On the one hand, depending on the context, virtue will be beneficial or deleterious to the association; on the other hand, justice disappears in extremely happy or unhappy forms of association (Humian argument). Since justice emerges in a context of plurality, Rawls criticizes utilitarianism in so far as it wants to extend norms that apply to individuals to a whole society. The fact that we are distinct persons, defined by systems of different purposes, is therefore a prerequisite for justice, and in this sense it can be said that the plurality of subjects is given before their unity, that the relationship precedes its terms. But where Rawls considers that each individual has a single system of ends, utilitarianism, like all intersubjective conceptions of society (those that recognize entities such as the "nation", for example), considers that there are several, therefore there are several "I's" within the individual. Rawls acknowledges the relevance of utilitarianism for private moral choices, insofar as the individual is not allowed to have preferences that are inconsistent over time because this would mean not considering oneself as an identical person over time: it is to this extent that the concept of justice also applies in private moral decisions. By making it impossible for systems of ends to modify the identity of the self, Rawls poses, in the "original position", a constraint on conceptions of the good in society. From this point of view, Rawls' deontological liberalism is thus not axiologically neutral. Sandel's critique will focus precisely on this conception of the person, showing that we do not consider ourselves that coherently (we are not "the kind of creatures that deontological ethics would like us to be"), and that when we do, this conception of the person is not sufficient to found Rawls' position. The Rawlsian conception of the person has important implications in the field of distributive justice, in that it distinguishes what one is from what one has (as a possession), and Rawls argues that individual talents derived from innate dispositions that are necessarily unequally distributed are possessions of which I am only the custodian, and which are therefore not individual talents to which I would have a primitive right, but a common resource to which the institutions give me a positive right in an institutional framework where the exercise of my talents is regulated in such a way that it benefits others and especially the most disadvantaged maximally: I have no natural right to a private exercise of my talents. The initial distribution is not fair, it is random and arbitrary; the libertarian position does not consist, for Rawls, in preserving justice, but in perpetuating natural arbitrariness; it is not the initial distribution that is unjust, but the institutional neutrality of which it is the object. Rawls thus attacks meritocratic conceptions of justice by arguing that egalitarian redistribution does not violate individual identity; he goes so far as to say that the notion of "merit" does not apply either to individuals who make more effort than others, because the willingness to make more effort than others may well also be innate. Rawls rejects any pre-institutional notion of virtue, which is consistent with the pre-eminence of justice over virtue and good in his theory. Nozick may blame Rawls, by subtracting individual talents from the "person," for reverting to an abstract and purified conception that Rawls was fleeing from in Kantian ethics. Sandel proposes to save Rawls' "principle of difference" by defending not that others do not violate my identity when they use the resource of my talents, because these talents are only detachable attributes of my person, but by defending that it is not "others" who invade my self by using these resources, because the self is intersubjective and constituted by the community for all its non-genetic characteristics (temperament, humor, culture, manners). This argument supports the idea that there is no assignable intrinsic merit, but it can be reversed: if there is no assignable intrinsic merit, there is no demerit (assignable intrinsic) either. Therefore, why, if a man who builds a window cannot enjoy the totality of the benefits of his productive conduct, should I suffer the totality of the costs of my negative conduct when I am punished for breaking the window? Obviously, if the self has only attributes, if it is "unencumbered", as Rawls calls it, and the characteristics are randomly distributed, then one comes to punish actions and not men, and Rawls thus gives birth to a non-moral theory of punishment that conflicts with human dignity (Nozick). Moreover, even if one accepts Rawls' theory of the unencumbered self, with characteristics falling from the sky and people without any attributes, it does not follow that, under the pretext that no one deserves the characteristics falling from the sky, they should be redistributed. Since the characteristics come to exist already "in" persons, and since this mode of existence does not violate any rights, it follows that these individuals, while not deserving their possessions, are nonetheless entitled to them. Sandel challenges the Nozickian argument by saying that rights require an institutional structure (and therefore we are back to square one), but this is not the case for Nozick, because the rights he is talking about are natural rights. Second, if one follows the Rawlsian position of randomly distributed characteristics, it is not clear how society comes to own, if not by common agreement of individuals, but since individuals do not, according to Rawls, have a right to their characteristics, it is not clear how they would transfer this right to society by contract, and therefore, by extension, why their common agreement would carry any weight. Even if I admit that the characteristics of my social environment (there should be a term that precisely designates 'properties that do not depend on me' but I do not have any) determine to some extent my faculties, two people with the same basic characteristics may end up with different faculties in the long run and two people with the same faculties did not necessarily have the same basic characteristics. So the reasoning doesn't hold. This brings us back to Rawls' theory of the contract, doubly hypothetical, since it describes an event that did not take place (which is not the case with all contractualist theories, as Sandel, 162, points out) between individuals who do not and cannot exist. There are two ways of conceiving the legitimacy of a contract: (1) voluntary consent and (2) the fairness of these terms. These two approaches complement and compete with each other (consent to the contract can provide a moral basis for obliging contractors to honour an inequitable commitment or vice versa). The Rawlsian contract is not a contract in this sense of the term: it does not give rise to obligations but to principles of justice, which are of two types : a) Principles applicable to institutions, b) Principles applicable to individuals. b) establishes the duties and obligations of individuals towards institutions and towards each other. Let us define these two categories (duties and obligations) : i. Natural duties, i.e. what is morally owed to individuals without their consent (example: the duty to help others when they are in distress), ii. Obligations, which are moral ties voluntarily agreed to, but which are binding only if what we agree to is right. It is not the promise that binds but the principle of fidelity that says "keep your word", and which is based on a just background.

  12. 4 out of 5

    Shayan Hamraz

    همان طور که مترجم هم می‌گوید کتاب به شدت سخت و سنگین است. و ترجمه دقیق و غیر آزاد مترجم هم به سختی آن می‌افزاید. به شکل ریز و موشکافانه‌ای به نقد نظریه رالز می‌پردازد. لذا تسلط به آثار رالز لازمه فهم این کتاب است. و در کل برای کسانی که به دنبال تعمّق در نظریه عدالت رالز هستند، اثر به شدت ارزشمند و قابل تأملی است.

  13. 5 out of 5

    Billie Pritchett

    Michael Sandel's Liberalism and the Limits of Justice is an argument against Classical Liberalism, at least as Classical Liberalism is expressed in the political philosophy of John Rawls. Rawls, in his book A Theory of Justice, argued that the role of government is social justice. He defended the view that there are certain basic freedoms that everyone should respect regardless of the person and that cannot be violated. He also claimed that any social inequality that arises should be allowed pro Michael Sandel's Liberalism and the Limits of Justice is an argument against Classical Liberalism, at least as Classical Liberalism is expressed in the political philosophy of John Rawls. Rawls, in his book A Theory of Justice, argued that the role of government is social justice. He defended the view that there are certain basic freedoms that everyone should respect regardless of the person and that cannot be violated. He also claimed that any social inequality that arises should be allowed provided the society and the government helps to make the poorest and the least advantage better off, and this is to be a constant challenge for any government. Sandel challenges Rawls's position on the grounds that Rawls's theory of justice implies too limited a view of human nature and the self. According to Sandel, Rawls's theory conceives of persons apart from the societies in which they grow up and the other aspects that in ordinary life would normally form their identity. Sandel thinks that if we are to consider questions of justice, among other sorts of values, we have to take seriously a view of persons that includes their social milieus and that aims at some view of what a good life would be like for them. I won't get into it here, but I think Sandel actually mischaracterizes Rawls' position, and is in some sense arguing at cross purposes. But that is another discussion and I'll leave it for readers familiar with Rawls to decide that.

  14. 5 out of 5

    Sergei Moska

    ... more like 3.5 stars, but it makes sense to round up just because it's a very high-quality argument and a seminal communitarian critique of liberalism. Sandel was not persuasive to me - the points with which I agreed were (in my opinion) trivial or unproblematic, and the points in which I disagreed were due (again, in my opinion) to an unnecessarily uncharitable reading of Rawls as well as to occasional equivocation of what Rawls means by "I" when discussing the original position. That said, ... more like 3.5 stars, but it makes sense to round up just because it's a very high-quality argument and a seminal communitarian critique of liberalism. Sandel was not persuasive to me - the points with which I agreed were (in my opinion) trivial or unproblematic, and the points in which I disagreed were due (again, in my opinion) to an unnecessarily uncharitable reading of Rawls as well as to occasional equivocation of what Rawls means by "I" when discussing the original position. That said, a good book is a good book. This is not a beginners' book, though. You should have a decent grasp of "Theory of Justice" before reading it.

  15. 5 out of 5

    Tobey

    Very helpful for understanding Rawls and what is at stake in deontological views of justice. Not sure how much of his criticism is not found in Nozick but his criticism is free from the most unappealing and least plausible aspects (self-ownership, etc.) of Nozick's own libertarian theory. Very helpful for understanding Rawls and what is at stake in deontological views of justice. Not sure how much of his criticism is not found in Nozick but his criticism is free from the most unappealing and least plausible aspects (self-ownership, etc.) of Nozick's own libertarian theory.

  16. 4 out of 5

    Roberto

    Uno de los mejores libros...

  17. 5 out of 5

    Kim

    A difficult, but very worthwhile, read. Makes me thirst for more.

  18. 5 out of 5

    John Duff

    A thorough critique and argument for the inadequacy of Rawlsian liberalism in support of Rawls' justice as fairness principle. A thorough critique and argument for the inadequacy of Rawlsian liberalism in support of Rawls' justice as fairness principle.

  19. 4 out of 5

    Jacob

    A brilliant attack on John Rawls "A Theory of Justice". A brilliant attack on John Rawls "A Theory of Justice".

  20. 5 out of 5

    ahmad

    شاید بتوان گفت نظریه عدالت جان رالز یکی از مهم‌ترین نظریات متاخر از لیبرالیسم هست و البته کتاب لیبرالیسم و منتقدان آن (که در ویرایش دوم به لیبرالیسم و محدودیت‌های عدالت تغییر نام داد) یکی از مهم‌ترین نقدها بر نظریه عدالت رالز است. در واقع اگرچه رالز قصد داشت لیبرالیسم را دوباره نجات دهد اما به نظر می‌رسد در این مسیر چندان موفق نبوده است. یکی از ایده‌های خلاقانه‌ای که رالز مطرح می‌کند ایده حجاب نادانی است. این ایده می‌گوید که قانونگذار پیش از آنکه قانون بگذارد باید در حجابی از جهل به سر ببرد و هی شاید بتوان گفت نظریه عدالت جان رالز یکی از مهم‌ترین نظریات متاخر از لیبرالیسم هست و البته کتاب لیبرالیسم و منتقدان آن (که در ویرایش دوم به لیبرالیسم و محدودیت‌های عدالت تغییر نام داد) یکی از مهم‌ترین نقدها بر نظریه عدالت رالز است. در واقع اگرچه رالز قصد داشت لیبرالیسم را دوباره نجات دهد اما به نظر می‌رسد در این مسیر چندان موفق نبوده است. یکی از ایده‌های خلاقانه‌ای که رالز مطرح می‌کند ایده حجاب نادانی است. این ایده می‌گوید که قانونگذار پیش از آنکه قانون بگذارد باید در حجابی از جهل به سر ببرد و هیچ اطلاعی از وضعیت زندگی، وضعیت مالی، جنسیت و... نداشته باشد. در این صورت قانونی که وی تصویب می‌کند قطعا عادلانه است. سندل این ایده را به چالش می‌کشد و می‌کوید چنین تعریفی تنها با انکار این امر مشترک قابل استفاده است که مفاهیم و ارزش ها از هویت ما جدایی ناپذیر هستند. همچنین رالز معتقد است نقش دولت عدالت اجتماعی است. وی می‌گوید اگرچه نابرابری اجتماعی عضو جدایی ناپذیر هر سیستم اجتماعی است اما چالش ثابت تمام دولت‌ها این است که مزیت‌هایی به فقیر‌ترین و کم برخوردارترین اقشار جامعه کمک کند. سندل این موضع را نیز به چالش می‌کشد. وی می‌گوید نظریه عدالت رالز دید بسیار محدودی به طبیعت انسان و خود انسان دارد. سندل می‌گوید که نظریه رالز افراد را از جوامعی که در آن رشد کرده‌اند جدا می‌داند. وی می‌گوید دولت باید علاوه‌بر اینکه به نیازها جهان شمول افراد دقت کند، باید بر هدف آنها در زندگی باتوجه به محیط اجتماعی آنها نیز دقت کند. در پایان کتاب نیز سندل نوع جدیدی از ساختار اجتماعی را مطرح می‌کند. به نظر سندل هم سیستم نیمه متمرکز لیبرالیسم و هم سیستم شورایی شوروی ساختارهای ناقصی از عدالت و آزادی را مطرح می‌کنند. تمرکز وی عمدتا بر سیستم شورایی هست که در زمان لنین برچیده شد. این سیستم مطمئنا نمی‌توانست برای مدت زیادی ادامه پیدا کند چرا که نظام برنامه ریزی متمرکز حزب بلشویک برای کارایی بیشتر الزاما مجبور بود هرگونه آزادی را از افراد بگیرد. از نظر سندل بهترین سیستم اجتماعی آن است که کشور مانند هرم هایی اداره شود که هرکدام نه به وسیله نوک هرم که به وسیله قاعده هرم مدیریت شوند. میخواستم مطلب مفصلتری بنویسم اما این کار مستلزم آن هست که کتاب‌های رالز را خوانده باشم از این رو بحث اساسی‌تر را به زمانی دیگر موکول می‌کنم.

  21. 4 out of 5

    Zoltan Pogatsa

    Very few challenges to Rawls are interesting. This one is, althouhgh I fell it is not really a challenge, but more a situational extension. Rawls helps us set the etalon, Sandel helps us think it through how we can get there.

  22. 5 out of 5

    Emre vs.

    Rawls hatmine mukabil okunmasına...

  23. 5 out of 5

    Evans M

    This seems like an interesting subject that I should look into

  24. 5 out of 5

    Wes

    My (extensive) critique here: http://www.partiallyexaminedlife.com/... My (extensive) critique here: http://www.partiallyexaminedlife.com/...

  25. 4 out of 5

    Stephen Rankin

    Closely argued. Deeply thought-provoking.

  26. 5 out of 5

    jny2cornell

  27. 5 out of 5

    Povilas Gembickis

  28. 5 out of 5

    Clayton Hawkins

  29. 5 out of 5

    Mohamad Ranjos

  30. 4 out of 5

    Ben Muse

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