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General George C. Marshall, chief of staff of the U.S. Army during World War II, faced the daunting task not only of overseeing two theaters of a global conflict but also of selecting the best generals to carry out American grand strategy. Marshall and His Generals is the first and only book to focus entirely on that selection process and the performances, both stellar and General George C. Marshall, chief of staff of the U.S. Army during World War II, faced the daunting task not only of overseeing two theaters of a global conflict but also of selecting the best generals to carry out American grand strategy. Marshall and His Generals is the first and only book to focus entirely on that selection process and the performances, both stellar and disappointing, that followed from it. Stephen Taaffe chronicles and critiques the background, character, achievements, and failures of the more than three dozen general officers chosen for top combat group commands--from commanders like Dwight Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur to some nearly forgotten. Taaffe explores how and why Marshall selected the Army's commanders. Among his chief criteria were character (including unselfish and devoted purpose), education, (whether at West Point, Fort Leavenworth, or the Army War College), and striking a balance between experience and relative youth in a war that required both wisdom and great physical stamina. As the war unfolded, Marshall also factored into his calculations the combat leadership his generals demonstrated and the opinions of his theater commanders. Taaffe brings into sharp focus the likes of Eisenhower, MacArthur, George Patton, Omar Bradley, Walter Krueger, Robert Eichelberger, Courtney Hodges, Lucian Truscott, J. Lawton Collins, Alexander Sandy Patch, Troy Middleton, Matthew Ridgeway, Mark Clark, and twenty-five other generals who served in the conflict. He describes their leadership and decision-making processes and provides miniature biographies and personality sketches of these men drawn from their personal papers, official records, and reflections of fellow officers. Delving deeper than other studies, this path-breaking work produces a seamless analysis of Marshall's selection process of operational-level commanders. Taaffe also critiques the performance of these generals during the war and reveals the extent to which their actions served as stepping stones to advancement. Ambitious in scope and filled with sharp insights, Marshall and His Generals is essential reading for anyone interested in World War II and military leadership more generally.


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General George C. Marshall, chief of staff of the U.S. Army during World War II, faced the daunting task not only of overseeing two theaters of a global conflict but also of selecting the best generals to carry out American grand strategy. Marshall and His Generals is the first and only book to focus entirely on that selection process and the performances, both stellar and General George C. Marshall, chief of staff of the U.S. Army during World War II, faced the daunting task not only of overseeing two theaters of a global conflict but also of selecting the best generals to carry out American grand strategy. Marshall and His Generals is the first and only book to focus entirely on that selection process and the performances, both stellar and disappointing, that followed from it. Stephen Taaffe chronicles and critiques the background, character, achievements, and failures of the more than three dozen general officers chosen for top combat group commands--from commanders like Dwight Eisenhower and Douglas MacArthur to some nearly forgotten. Taaffe explores how and why Marshall selected the Army's commanders. Among his chief criteria were character (including unselfish and devoted purpose), education, (whether at West Point, Fort Leavenworth, or the Army War College), and striking a balance between experience and relative youth in a war that required both wisdom and great physical stamina. As the war unfolded, Marshall also factored into his calculations the combat leadership his generals demonstrated and the opinions of his theater commanders. Taaffe brings into sharp focus the likes of Eisenhower, MacArthur, George Patton, Omar Bradley, Walter Krueger, Robert Eichelberger, Courtney Hodges, Lucian Truscott, J. Lawton Collins, Alexander Sandy Patch, Troy Middleton, Matthew Ridgeway, Mark Clark, and twenty-five other generals who served in the conflict. He describes their leadership and decision-making processes and provides miniature biographies and personality sketches of these men drawn from their personal papers, official records, and reflections of fellow officers. Delving deeper than other studies, this path-breaking work produces a seamless analysis of Marshall's selection process of operational-level commanders. Taaffe also critiques the performance of these generals during the war and reveals the extent to which their actions served as stepping stones to advancement. Ambitious in scope and filled with sharp insights, Marshall and His Generals is essential reading for anyone interested in World War II and military leadership more generally.

30 review for Marshall and His Generals: U.S. Army Commanders in World War II

  1. 4 out of 5

    Jean

    George Marshall was appointed Chief of Staff of the Army on the day Britain declared war on Germany. The army was small and had suffered decades of austerity. The promotions had been stagnant and there was lots of deadwood. Marshall had to quickly get rid of the deadwood, increase the size of the army and provide it with the latest equipment as he prepared the army for World War II. The book is less about Marshall the man, but focuses on how he chose his generals and a brief biography of each of George Marshall was appointed Chief of Staff of the Army on the day Britain declared war on Germany. The army was small and had suffered decades of austerity. The promotions had been stagnant and there was lots of deadwood. Marshall had to quickly get rid of the deadwood, increase the size of the army and provide it with the latest equipment as he prepared the army for World War II. The book is less about Marshall the man, but focuses on how he chose his generals and a brief biography of each of his generals. Taaffe provides a good understanding of how Marshall’s command appointment directly influenced the war. Taaffe points out the strong and weak points of each general. The author includes the famous and lesser known generals and covers both the European and Pacific theatres. The book is well written and researched. The author left me with a good understanding of the command staff during World War II. The book is easily readable. I read this as an audiobook downloaded from Audible. The book is just over seventeen hours. James Anderson Foster does a good job narrating the book. Foster is a ten-time Voice Arts nominated Audiobook Narrator. He won in 2015, 2016 and 2017. This is my first experience listening to Foster. This is also the first time I have read a book by historian, Stephen R. Taaffe.

  2. 5 out of 5

    Ken Hammond

    Interesting book covering the relationships between US top general Marshall and then the top 38 American generals that planned the battles against Germany and Japan. .

  3. 5 out of 5

    Nathan

    Stephen Taaffe wrote an interesting and informative history of the primary generals in World War II. I was, however, expecting more of a biography when I began the book. I sought the book after visiting the National WWII Museum in New Orleans, which prompted a search for more information on George Marshall. The description I read classified “Marshall and His Generals” as a biography that focused on Marshall’s strategy in selecting generals during the military campaigns. I wrongly interpreted thi Stephen Taaffe wrote an interesting and informative history of the primary generals in World War II. I was, however, expecting more of a biography when I began the book. I sought the book after visiting the National WWII Museum in New Orleans, which prompted a search for more information on George Marshall. The description I read classified “Marshall and His Generals” as a biography that focused on Marshall’s strategy in selecting generals during the military campaigns. I wrongly interpreted this thesis as a biography first with the selection process a key theme of the larger biography. In hindsight, it would have been wise for me to have read a traditional biography first before tackling Taaffe’s book. My critique stems more from the breadth of generals that Taaffe chose to highlight. I expected a more exclusive look at Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley, MacArthur, Clark, and perhaps other generals who spent more years at the four-star rank. Instead, Taaffe gave a briefer look at a broader range of generals. It was still an interesting book, but the result was less of an in-depth approach than I prefer. It also read more as a recitation of facts as the author moved down the ranks to the generals who had a less significant role in the campaigns. I recommend this book for people with a deep fascination in World War II and George Marshall, but I would steer people away who are less knowledgeable about the subject. Here are some of my observations from the book ● Taaffe opened his book by telling a story of a grade-school class that wrote General Marshall a letter asking about the standards he used when selecting generals. Marshall responded with character as the integral trait when choosing his team. Though not in the letter, Marshall also placed great value on education—specifically officer training at Leavenworth and the Army War College in D.C.—and youthfulness. Marshall’s experiences in WWI engrained a belief that field generals must be young enough to provide the energy to succeed in boots-on-the-ground combat. Conversely, Marshall ignored former requisites for generals like family connections and political connections when elevating officers. Finally, Marshall was willing to advance oddballs who did not fit conventional thinking—Patton being a good example. He wanted people who would stand up and fight during adversity. ● Taaffe did a nice job distinguishing the role of the corps commander—solely a battle leader, a tactical commander. By comparison, a division commander oversees logistical matters. Marshall used the field commanders as the training ground for his generals. ● After the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) began coordinating the WWII military operations, there was a regular issue of turf wars—more focused on whether the army or navy would command, rather than the best way to win the conflict. ● Douglas MacArthur was born on an Arkansas military base to Arthur MacArthur, a Union war hero. Taaffe reminded me how perilous the pacific front was after the Pearl Harbor bombing. The strategic base was largely out of commission, and Japan’s territorial expansion in the pacific isolated US troops in the Philippians. MacArthur came out of retirement to lead the pacific campaign. ● MacArthur was a walking encyclopedia with charisma. His record in the Philippines was an exclamation mark for those who claimed his egomania and vanity trumped his many strengths. There, he oversold or outright deceived higher ups as he prepared the Philippines for independence. Japan’s success revealed the lack of preparations. ● As Taaffe transitioned to the North Africa Campaign, he discussed the similarities and differences in how Marshall and Eisenhower selected generals. Taaffe noted that both Marshall and Eisenhower valued commanders with energy, toughness, selflessness, and youth. They both disfavored political connections and military heritage while valuing character. Unlike Marshall, Eisenhower more deeply valued recent combat experience and downplayed education. Eisenhower also proved more loyal than Marshall’s cold-bloodedness when it came to results. Still, the two respectfully worked together on personnel decisions. ● During this section of the Book, Taaffe also distinguished Eisenhower from Macarthur. Despite drawing from the same pool and using the same selection methods, Eisenhower’s generals became more famous in part because Eisenhower publicized them and MacArthur intentionally kept his generals out of the limelight. Eisenhower was also more likely to engage his generals in the broad decision-making of war strategy. ● Even a survey book like “Marshall and His Generals” highlights Fox Connors’s role in mentoring Eisenhower and encouraging him to be a life-long learner of history and military strategy. He was middle of the pack at West Point, yet he finished #1 from Command and General Staff College. ● It is interesting how many of the noted generals in WWII were both west of the Mississippi. ● General Mark Clark was a staff officer and deputy commander of Allied Forces in North Africa. After Operation Torch, Eisenhower promoted Clark to commander of U.S. Fifth Army and tasked him with the invasion of Italy. Naming Clark as commander was a surprising move, but this decision highlights Eisenhower’s trait of recognizing those who helped him achieve success. ● General Ernest Harmon received the assignment of shoring up North Africa, after the situation reached critical levels in Tunisia and Algeria. His great success helped stabilize the situation, which led to the ouster of Lloyd Fredendall. Eisenhower then offered Harmon the North Africa command, which Harmon declined because of his role in ousting Fredendall. He then recommended George Patton for the role, which proved a great benefit to the Allied Forces. ● Omar Bradley and Patton complemented each other effectively—both in personality and skills. Patton was disinterested in the non-military elements of war like logistics and administration. Bradley smoothed Patton’s rough edges, and he appreciated Patton’s aggressiveness and strategy. Despite the characterization that Patton did not care about the non-military elements of war, he took steps like precisely implementing dress codes, which drew the ire of his soldiers. Yet he did so with a clear eye on instilling the discipline necessary to build up the troops for victory. ● The Allied victory in North Africa was important both from a strategic point to launch attacks on mainland Europe and from a morale standpoint. Afterwards, however, Bradley and Patton resented the way Eisenhower focused on the joint effort of the campaign under the Allied banner. During the celebration of the victory, they saw Eisenhower as Anglophilic and overlooking of the U.S. role in securing victory. Yet Marshall valued Eisenhower’s role in coordinating land, sea, and air attacks all with multiple nations joining in the fight. Marshall and Eisenhower had their eyes on the larger prize, and Eisenhower did not notice the resentment. ● The generals in World War II illustrate how much your personal connections matter—be it military or civilian. The generals with long-term or meaningful connections to those in command received far more meaningful commendations and more second chances to succeed. Those that received the second chances seemed to grow into the role of commander. Contrast General Geoffrey Keyes—a good friend of General Patton who received second chances—with General John Lucas, whose amphibious attack on Italy included minimal support yet created a potential path to Rome. Lucas stayed on the beachhead to dig in and await reinforcements instead of attacking. This plan proved faulty, and Lucas had no one in higher ranks to support him. And so General Mark Clark replaced Lucas with General Lucian Truscott. No one around Clark liked him, but Marshall and Churchill did. That backing kept Clark in command. This raises an interesting causation-correlation issue. Did those who received second chances learn from previous experiences to succeed? Or were those who received the second chances rightly identified by their commanders as the ones with the mettle and intelligence to succeed? For a follow-up consideration: as Eisenhower prepared for Operation Overlord, he increasingly leaned toward battle-hardened commanders rather than rookies who had proven capable during stateside operations. This was a point of divergence for Eisenhower and Marshall, and it adds texture to the debate on how much prior experience is a predictor of future success. ● General William H. Gill already spent time in the Pacific prior to joining MacArthur’s campaign. He disagreed with his role in the plan because he observed the 32nd Division was untrained in jungle warfare. I wonder how much this essential element—knowing the terrain and knowing the enemy’s techniques—hindered the U.S. in future wars. Did the success in Europe leave the country overconfident in Korea and Vietnam? ● Marshall’s willingness to defer on staying as Chief of Staff rather than commanding the Overlord Campaign shows a depth of perspective and humility. Everyone seemed in agreement that he was the best person for the job, but there was no one better for the role of Chief of Staff. President Roosevelt recognized that the risk to congressional relations could hinder the overall war effort because only Marshall provided enough credibility to support Roosevelt when his plans went before Congress. ● In northwest Europe, Eisenhower and Bradley gained a reputation for a quick trigger finger when eliminating commanders who failed to perform. Bradley even lamented that it was perhaps unjust to blame one man when so many things could go wrong in battle. But both generals valued accountability. Unfortunately, the effect ended up spreading a message of cautiousness. Generals wanted to avoid making mistakes to preserve their commands rather than sustaining the aggressiveness needed to win. Patton criticized Bradley’s quickness in summarily removing senior commanders from their role. He noted that people needed to learn from their mistakes. All in all, "Marshall and His Generals" was a solid survey book that helped record the careers of generals that might otherwise escape a lasting record of their service to the United States. Such an outcome would be tragic for the way they sacrificed. I still prefer books with a narrower scope and a more in-depth analysis, but I still enjoyed "Marshall and His Generals." There were times the book seemed more like a quick entry in an encyclopedia list of generals, but the end result is a solid snapshot of the men that served and led in World War II.

  4. 4 out of 5

    Mike Kershaw

    This book examines the 38 General Officers in World War II that commanded at the Corps, Army and Army Group level in all theatres in World War II. While the book is focused on Marshall's role in their selection for command billets, it spends a great deal of time on the various theatre commanders, particularly Eisenhower and his selection criteria as well. Marshall's initial selection criteria were Age, Theatre Commanders desires and the reputation these generals developed as trainers -- an asses This book examines the 38 General Officers in World War II that commanded at the Corps, Army and Army Group level in all theatres in World War II. While the book is focused on Marshall's role in their selection for command billets, it spends a great deal of time on the various theatre commanders, particularly Eisenhower and his selection criteria as well. Marshall's initial selection criteria were Age, Theatre Commanders desires and the reputation these generals developed as trainers -- an assessment in many cases passed to Marshall by the Commander of Army Ground Forces, General McNair. Combat Experience, although considered, was not a discriminator from Marshall's standpoint. The book follows a pattern of introducing Commanders with short biographical summaries as they arrive in Command billets in the combat zones, not their relative seniority (thus you don't meet Stilwell in earnest till the end of the book). As the author follows this theme, he highlights a couple of significant trends. As Bradley, Patton and others emerge from the North Africa experience, he follows Patton's maturation as a commander -- from North Africa/Sicily (abrasive, fighting with subordinates, etc...) to Europe (more forgiving, got most out of his Corps Cdrs) and will place this in context later in the book. The North Africa, Sicily and Italy portions spend time discussing the various significant reliefs -- Freedenhall at Kassarine, Dawley at Sicily and Lucas at Anzio -- all failures of Corps level Commanders -- and weighs the merits of thier relief with the responsibility of the officer, the other factors (the Germans, maybe?) and their higher commander's perspective. The lessons learned from these undoubtedly affect Eisenhower's selection criteria as he approaches the Normandy Invasion. Eisenhower would more heavily weigh combat experience and personal relationships although he rarely opposed officers Marshall directed him to take. Bradley's role is examined, albeit probably not to the extent others have attributed to him the responsibility for the selection of these commanders across the ETO. Bradley's headquarters comes across as 'micro-managing' and while more productive, the source of more reliefs and more abrasive commanders, in general (as laid out a while back in an article by (then) Major Dan Bolger). Normandy provides the crucible for the American Army, not surprisingly. The challenge of Normandy is from this perspective the large number of "green" divisions which must be brought into a particularly savage fight with a paucity of GO's with combat experience -- and a corresponding large numbers of reliefs. Those officers who transferred from the Pacific are followed (Collins, Patch, Cortlett) and the requirements of the forces in contact in the Italy/Med theatre taken into consideration (Eisenhower tried hard to get Truscott for Northern Europe but was foiled by Devers). One Commander even went from Europe (Woodruff) to the Pacific, against the proverbial grain. The Pacific isn't neglected although the MacArthur/Marshall relationship is much more formal -- Marshall granting MacArthur great leeway in assigning his commanders. He follows, in particular, Kruger and Eichelberger as MacArthur plays them against each other for what seems to be the better part of the war. The early travails in the Solomons (where Patch, Collins and Hodge among others, cut their teeth), the Army-Marine controversy on Saipan, the Philippine Campaign and later Okinawa (where we finally meet both Buckner and Stilwell) are all covered. He closes with a discussion of how both Marshall and MacArthur saw the Army's leadership for the invasion of Japan. He concludes by ranking relative effectivenss: The 'best' Army Commanders seem to be Simpson, Patch and Eichelberger -- interestingly not well known to the public. Hodges in Europe and Krueger in the Pacific are recognized as abrasive but productive; and seem to be sources of dissent with subordinates. He is suprisingly critical of Eisenhower although his conclusions support his thesis that Eisenhower played more favorites and had a significant bias against Devers -- seemingly pity in retrospect. Patton, Bradley, Stillwell and Clark are recognized as being in class of their own -- no real peers for relative comparisions amongst Army Commanders while Truscott and Collins come across as most productive Corps commanders; Ridgeway less so due to role. Patton, against interestingly, comes across as the Army Commander who gets the most out of his subordinates, particularly in Europe where he has less dissention and fewer reliefs. Finally, as befitting this type of study, the officers' post war careers are breifly summarized and we see that Ridgeway, Walker, Van Fleet and Collins all have significant post-war role/Korea roles in the Army. More, however, as befitting MacArthur's famous quote, quietly fade away.

  5. 5 out of 5

    Ashlee

    Pretty good book! As someone who is pretty well versed in the happenings of WWII, I really feel that this book did a good job introducing the main players. I don't necessarily know that it does the best job of connecting each of those characters to Marshall, but it did that with a few of them. This would be a good reference book to read before studying the major actions of WWII in order to understand the leaders that took part in them. Pretty good book! As someone who is pretty well versed in the happenings of WWII, I really feel that this book did a good job introducing the main players. I don't necessarily know that it does the best job of connecting each of those characters to Marshall, but it did that with a few of them. This would be a good reference book to read before studying the major actions of WWII in order to understand the leaders that took part in them.

  6. 5 out of 5

    Gerry

    Actually, this has little to do with General Marshall’s relationships with “his” generals. Throughout his career, he had occasion to meet, observe, or interact with the majority of the folks who were to become corps and higher-level commanders, and, from what he knew or thought of them, influenced their future assignments. He favored youth (perceived stamina) and did not impose combat experience as a criterion (many officers had stateside assignments in World War I). Of course, he was in frequen Actually, this has little to do with General Marshall’s relationships with “his” generals. Throughout his career, he had occasion to meet, observe, or interact with the majority of the folks who were to become corps and higher-level commanders, and, from what he knew or thought of them, influenced their future assignments. He favored youth (perceived stamina) and did not impose combat experience as a criterion (many officers had stateside assignments in World War I). Of course, he was in frequent communication with the two theater commanders, Eisenhower and MacArthur, and handled each differently. Most of the book is about the generals themselves and how well they executed their missions. The corps commanders (two- and three-star generals) would of course get support or grief from the generals above them, and this is mostly what author Taaffe is covering. We meet a general, get a brief bio, learn of how Marshall knew him, and then how well he did his job. Taaffe praises or dings them depending on what they did or how they interacted with their subordinates. Simpson, Collins and Eichelberger come out especially well, Krueger, Clark and Hodges less so. Patton blows hot and cold. Mostly it’s an enjoyable read about the generals who fought the war, many of whom we may not have heard of before, so enjoy the learning!

  7. 5 out of 5

    Jonathan

    This is not a bad book, as far as it goes. The problem is that it doesn't go far enough. Professor Traffe had an opportunity to make an in-depth examination of all aspects of U.S Army leadership in the Second World War. This should have included generals who raised and trained troops for combat and for support, generals who commanded logistical and technical units, generals who served as high-level staff officers (with a few famous exceptions like Beetle and Sutherland), generals who lead the de This is not a bad book, as far as it goes. The problem is that it doesn't go far enough. Professor Traffe had an opportunity to make an in-depth examination of all aspects of U.S Army leadership in the Second World War. This should have included generals who raised and trained troops for combat and for support, generals who commanded logistical and technical units, generals who served as high-level staff officers (with a few famous exceptions like Beetle and Sutherland), generals who lead the development of new weapons, etc. Instead, he took the easy way out - as so many military historians do - by concentrating purely on combat operations, and describing the backgrounds and actions of higher unit commanders: corps-level and up. The result is a work that is skewed and fails to chronicle the strengths and weaknesses of the American Army leadership, and one that can only plot the careers of a small majority of American generals in WWII. So while we can learn some interesting facts about the not-so-famous combat leaders, very little new ground is broken here. It's a shame and a wasted opportunity. The book also has some editing issues and, considering the almost total emphasis on combat operations, the maps are execrable.

  8. 5 out of 5

    Stephen Graham

    Clearly related to Taaffe's earlier works Commanding the Army of the Potomac and Commanding Lincoln's Navy: Union Naval Leadership During the Civil War, this focuses on US Army leadership at the corps and higher level during World War Two. The number of men involved, while relatively few at thirty-eight, does preclude an in-depth look at any particular individual. Taaffe is not unduly critical of any individual involved, largely because each had some good qualities that recommended them for comm Clearly related to Taaffe's earlier works Commanding the Army of the Potomac and Commanding Lincoln's Navy: Union Naval Leadership During the Civil War, this focuses on US Army leadership at the corps and higher level during World War Two. The number of men involved, while relatively few at thirty-eight, does preclude an in-depth look at any particular individual. Taaffe is not unduly critical of any individual involved, largely because each had some good qualities that recommended them for command. The most interesting facets of the book are the attention paid to the Pacific theater and to the lesser-known commanders and units in the European theaters. In particular, the book pays a fair amount of attention to Jacob Devers and the Sixth Army Group. His selections for best commanders at each level are not particularly surprising, though Taaffe does highlight William Simpson of the Ninth Army as the best all-around army commander.

  9. 4 out of 5

    Sigrid Fry-Revere

    A little too much minutia for my taste.

  10. 4 out of 5

    Paul Guzman

    Good book, but most of the book is about the Corps and higher commanders than GEN George C. Marshall.

  11. 4 out of 5

    Lee

    Good coverage of the higher leadership cadre of the US Army, across both Pacific and European/Mediterranean theaters. The focus is how corps and field army commanders were selected, and how they interacted with each other and theater commanders once chosen. This area has become one of my favorite themes over the years, and this added little bits here and there to what I had already picked up. I agree with most of his assessments, with the possible exception of Bradley and Hodges-- I've turned a l Good coverage of the higher leadership cadre of the US Army, across both Pacific and European/Mediterranean theaters. The focus is how corps and field army commanders were selected, and how they interacted with each other and theater commanders once chosen. This area has become one of my favorite themes over the years, and this added little bits here and there to what I had already picked up. I agree with most of his assessments, with the possible exception of Bradley and Hodges-- I've turned a little down on them after recent readings. I see the author has given the Army of the Potomac the same treatment, so I'll be heading off to that one sooner or later.

  12. 5 out of 5

    Becky Dale

    Know what you're getting before you begin. This reads better than a textbook, but it can be summed up as an overview of US generals throughout WWII (complete with their dates of birth and a childhood anecdote) and their complex relationships with one another and, occasionally, the French, Brits, or Aussies. Gave me a new view of military operations, but had little to no storyline--not even the war itself, really. Know what you're getting before you begin. This reads better than a textbook, but it can be summed up as an overview of US generals throughout WWII (complete with their dates of birth and a childhood anecdote) and their complex relationships with one another and, occasionally, the French, Brits, or Aussies. Gave me a new view of military operations, but had little to no storyline--not even the war itself, really.

  13. 4 out of 5

    Frederic

  14. 4 out of 5

    Treb Courie

  15. 4 out of 5

    Seth Parks

  16. 5 out of 5

    Mason

  17. 4 out of 5

    M Tucker

  18. 5 out of 5

    Carol A. Kichen

  19. 5 out of 5

    Brett Matzenbacher

  20. 4 out of 5

    Michael

  21. 5 out of 5

    Alan

  22. 4 out of 5

    Craig Coulombe

  23. 4 out of 5

    Glenn

  24. 4 out of 5

    Jay Ruehrmund

  25. 5 out of 5

    Wilson

  26. 5 out of 5

    Bill Launder

  27. 4 out of 5

    Rick Solomon

  28. 5 out of 5

    Steve Spencer (he, him.his)

  29. 4 out of 5

    Dominic

  30. 4 out of 5

    Peter Eddicott

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